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TAXATION OF BELOW-MARKET LOANS UNDER § 7872:
THIS COULD BE A LOT SIMPLER!
**
John A. Lynch, Jr.
There are always going to be some economic benefits that flow
between related parties which escape taxation.
I. INTRODUCTION

Although such a pragmatic outlook might set well with the
libertarian, anti-tax outlook of the party that has controlled tax
legislation in the House of Representatives for over the last decade, 2 it
surely did not in the 1980s. Although perhaps many would think of that
era as a time of dramatic rate cuts, 3 there was also a great clamor to
make the tax code more "fair" to prevent taxpayers from taking unfair
advantage of the system.4 Oddly, this ran against another persistent
theme of that era-to make the tax law simpler. 5 This obsession with
"fairness" in some instances resulted in the enactment of provisions that
I.R.C. § 7872 (2000).
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore.
1. Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 931, 956 (1979) (Goffe, J., concurring), affirmed,
670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982).
2. See, e.g., Bob Kemper, Baby Steps on Tax Reform Chafe GOP, ATLANTA CONST., Nov.
29, 2004, at IA (indicating that both House Speaker Dennis Hastert and former Majority Leader
Tom Delay support proposal to replace income tax with national sales tax).
3. See Julian Block, Your Guide to the New Tax Laws, 72 A.B.A.J. 70 (1986).
4. See James A. Baker, FundamentalTax Reform: An Analysis of the President'sProposals,
27 S. TEX. L.R. 1, 6 (1985).
The average taxpayer has become convinced that others benefit from this growing
complexity and that he or she does not. He or she understands very well that as long as
the tax laws permit others to shelter income and thereby avoid paying a fair share of tax,
then he or she must make up the difference by paying a greater share.
Id.
5. See Ronald Reagan, Remarks and Question and Answer Session with Students of John A.
Holmes High School of Edenton, N.C., 1 PUB. PAPERS 594, 598 (May 13, 1986) ("[The tax code
has] been simplified to the place that you won't need a public accountant to tell you how much you
owe. You can figure out your tax yourself.").
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were complex, perhaps absurdly so; these provisions were too complex
to be administrable. 6
A signature 1980s "reform" provision is I.R.C. § 7872, adopted as
part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which regulates below-market
loans and placed the nose of the IRS into what had for decades been
regarded as the private financial affairs of taxpayers.7 The IRS provided
that in certain settings, taxpayers making loans are treated as having
done so at prescribed interest rates-whether or not they so desire.8
Essentially, § 7872 decreed that taxpayers are not, at least in certain
instances, permitted to give away the use of their money without adverse
tax consequences to the donor and the donee, consequences that
Congress, perhaps inadvertently, made harsher two years later.9
Although aimed at transactions within families and between corporations
and shareholders and employers and employees, § 7872 contains a
provision permitting the IRS to impute interest with respect to "tax
avoidance" loans, allowing a recasting of transactions far afield of the
circumstances that led to the adoption of § 7872.10
Section 7872 was one small part of the 1980s culture of tax reform
aimed at restricting tax avoidance. It entails complexity in pursuit of
fairness."' There is no question that interest-free and other below-market
loans were used before the adoption of § 7872 to flout double taxation of
corporate income, avoid taxation of compensation and to foster intrafamily shifting of income to lower bracket taxpayers. 12 Such problems
were significant and intractable in light of judicial unwillingness to
6. Examples of this phenomenon might include the addition to the Code ofI.R.C. § 461(h)'s
economic performance rule or the passive loss rules of I.R.C. § 50 1(a) or I.R.C. § 263A accounting
monstrosities added to the Code in 1986. This is not an exhaustive list, but it does include the
author's subjective "favorites" among onerous Code sections that probably have not made the world
a better place.
7. See Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 699 (1984).
8. "Did I hear you say that there must be a catch? Will you walk away from a fool and his
money?" BADFINGER, Come and Get It, on MAGIC CHISTIAN MUSIC (Apple Records 1970).
When § 7872 is applicable, alas, there must be a catch!
9. The adoption of I.R.C. § 163(h) in 1986, see Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2246 (1986), which
generally denies deduction of personal interest, significantly skewed this provision in the
government's favor. Whether or not this was intended or not in 1986 is unclear since the legislative
history of § 163(h) does not mention § 7872. See Brien D. Ward, The Taxation ofInterest-Free
Loans, 61 TUL.L. REV. 849, 887 (1987).
10. See I.R.C. § 7872 (c)(1)(D) and § 7872 (c)(3)(B).
11. See Douglas A. Allison, Taxation - Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 - Treatment of Loans
with Below-Market Interest Rates, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 745, 763 (1985).
12. See generally Lester B. Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal
Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law "Private" Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes,
13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 41-42 (1996) (discussing various responses to the imposition of double
taxation and noting the adoption of I.R.C. § 7872 as a response to interest-free loans).
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address the problem.1 3 As Professor Cooper stated: "A tax minimization
practice is attacked with reform legislation when the unarticulated, ever
14
changing, and rather illogical tax conscience of Congress is shocked.,
But well-intended efforts to control avoidance may themselves
exact a price. As stated by Professor McCaffery:
Ad hoc changes in the tax system designed to close particular
loopholes in narrow areas only serve to increase the structural and
technical complexity of the tax law as a whole. Increased technical
and structural complexity, in turn, put additional compliance 15burdens
on the taxpayer and increase incentives to find new loopholes.
This article will explore § 7872: what it is, why it was enacted, how
it has developed judicially and administratively since its enactment, and
how it might be improved - mostly by reducing its complexity. It shall
be contended generally that the "reform" intended with respect to § 7872
in several instances overshot the mark and serves no useful purpose.

II.

STRUCTURE AND WORKINGS OF §

7872

A. Applicability of Section and Transfersof Interest
Section 7872 presumes that if a loan to which the section applies
does not specify an interest rate, it then entails two transactions: a
transfer by the lender to the borrower of the loan proceeds at the
statutorily designated rate, as well as a transfer to the borrower to pay to
the lender this designated rate.1 6 This is not what really happens - it is
a fiction that accommodates the transactions hypothecated alternatively
by subsections (a) and (b) of § 7872.
The statutory floor as to loans covered by § 7872 is the applicable
13. See Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
14. George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Controlling Income Tax
Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 660 n.243 (1985) (praising § 7872).
15. Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267,
1278 (1990).
16. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-1(a), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33556 (Aug. 20, 1985).
Remarkably, while a number of provisions of § 7872 are dependent for implementation on the
adoption of regulations by the Treasury Department, few of the proposed regulations have been
implemented since they were proposed over 20 years ago. This has occasionally permitted the
Service to disavow the proposals when it was expedient. See, e.g., Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.
554 (1992). It has also been suggested that the difference between the proposed regulations and the
legislative history offers "a well-advised taxpayer a unique tax arbitrage opportunity." See Gary
Rozenshteyn, Below-Market Loans Offer Tax Arbitrage Potential, 64 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 260,
266 (2000). If that is correct, it is remarkable that the administration of an enactment aimed at tax
avoidance may itself create opportunities for ameliorating the statute's impact.
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federal rate. 17 This rate depends on the duration of the loan.18 The
short-term rate applies if the term of the loan is three years or less, the
mid-term rate if the term is over three years but less than nine years, and
the long-term rate if the term is over nine years.' 9 The applicable federal
rate for a demand loan is the short-term rate. 20 This rate is determined
monthly 2' on the basis of the average market yields on outstanding
marketable obligations of the United States.
A loan which does not
charge interest of at least the applicable federal rate is a below-market
loan. 23 The difference 24between the actual loan rate and the applicable
rate is forgone interest.
Proposed regulations treat a loan as:
[A]ny extension of credit (including, for example, a purchase money
mortgage) and any transaction under which the owner of money
permits another person to use the money for a period of time after
which the money is to be transferred to the owner or
applied according
25
to an express or implied agreement with the owner.
The proposed regulation states further that "loan" is to be "interpreted
broadly to implement the anti-abuse intent of the statute., 26 This flexible
conception of a loan has enabled the IRS to recharacterize transactions
far outside the circumstances that led to the enactment of § 7872,
transactions not obviously characterizable as loans.27
Section 7872 applies to six types of loans: gift loans,28
compensation-related loans, 29 corporation-shareholder loans, 30 taxavoidance loans,3 ' "other" below-market loans,32 and loans to qualified
continuing care facilities.33
17. I.R.C. § 7872 (e)(1)(A)(B), (f)(1), (2). The applicable federal rate is defined as the rate in
effect under I.R.C. § 1274(d).
18. See id.
at § 1274 (d)(1)(A).
19. Id.
20. Id. at § 7872 (f)(2).
21. Id. at § 1274(d)(1)(B).
22. Id. at § 1274(d)(1)(C).
23. Id. at § 7872(c)(1).
24. Id. at § 7872(e)(2).
25. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33557 (Aug. 20, 1985).
26. Id.
27. See Section IV.F.
28. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(A).
29. Id.at § 7872(c)(1)(B).
30. Id. at § (c)(1)(C).
31. Id. at § 7872(c)(1)(D).
32. Id.at § 7872(c)(1)(E). These are loans the interest arrangements of which have a
significant effect on any federal tax liability of the lender or borrower.
33. Id. at § 7872(c)(1)(F).
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Although there are some differences in the exceptions and
mechanisms of the application of § 7872 among these types of loans, the
primary distinction in the workings of the imputation of interest under §
7872 is that between demand and term loans. A demand loan is "any
34
loan which is payable in full at any time on the demand of the lender.,
A term loan is "any loan which is not a demand loan. 'a Under proposed
regulations, a loan is a term loan if the loan agreement specifies a time
that may be determined actuarially.3 6
The most important mechanisms of § 7872 are the provisions that
carry out the transfer of forgone interest in below-market loans from
lender to borrower and back again. 37 There are two such mechanisms:
subsection (a) for demand loans and subsection (b) for term loans.
Subsection (a) is simpler. It provides that with respect to a loan, 8
the forgone interest is transferred from the lender to the borrower and
retransferred from the borrower to the lender as interest. 39 Although §
7872 does not so state, this transfer is intended to be treated by the
lender as: "[A] gift, dividend, contribution to capital, payment of
compensation or other payment depending on the substance of the
transaction., 40 Again, although § 7872 itself does not so state, the
borrower on retransferring the forgone interest to the lender, is intended
to be paying the same amount of interest to the lender as was paid by the
lender to the borrower.4 1 The transfers effected with respect to demand
and gift loans during any calendar year are treated as made on the last
day of such calendar year. 42
The mechanism applicable to term loans is more complicated. The
lender of a below-market loan is treated as transferring to the borrower,
in cash, on the date the loan is made,43 an amount equal to the excess of

34.
35.
36.

Id. at § 7872(0(5).
Id. at § 7872(0(6).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-10(a)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33566 (proposed Aug. 20,

1985).
37. See Frederick R. Schneider, Which Tax Unitfor the FederalIncome Tax?, 20 U. DAYTON
L. REv. 93, 108 (1994) (referring to income attribution as, "an important aspect of Section 7872"
and explaining that topic's application).
38. Section 7872 treats gift loans as demand loans even when the loan agreement provides for

a term. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(1). For purposes of measuring a gift for gift tax purposes, § 7872(b)(1)
applies to gift loans that are term loans. Id. at § 7872(d)(2).

39. Id. at § 7872(a)(l)(A).
40.
41.

H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, at 1012 (1984) (Conf. Rep.).
Id.

42. I.R.C. § 7872(a)(2).
43. Id. at § 7872 (b)(1). If later, the lender shall be treated as having transferred on the first
day on which this section applies to the loan. Id.
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the amount loaned over the present value of all payments which are
required to be made under the terms of the loan. 4 Stated otherwise, if
the present value of all payments under the loan, discounted at the
applicable federal rate, is less than the amount loaned, the difference is
treated as transferred by the borrower to the lender at the time of the
loan. Whatever the consequences of such a transfer for the lender, the
borrower has income in the amount of the forgone interest. Depending
on the interest rate applicable to the term, the amount may be quite
large. 45 The present value of payments due under a loan is determined
as of the date of the loan by using a discount rate equal to the applicable
federal rate.46
The excess of the amount loaned over the present value of
payments under terms of the loan is treated as an original issue
discount.47 This requires inclusion by the lender of the daily portions of
the original issue discount for each day during the taxable year the debt
is outstanding.4 8
Although § 7872 uses the term "original issue discount" and the
proposed regulations refer to I.R.C. § 1272, 49 § 7872(b)(1) provides for
very different reporting consequences for the "holder" of what § 7872
deems to be an original issue discount obligation: a term loan. While
under § 1272(a), the holder of an original issue discount obligation
reports the daily portions of such interest for each day in the taxable year
in which he or she holds the obligation, the borrower of a term loan is
treated as receiving the entire amount of the original issue discount on
the date the loan is made. 50 This is a strong deterrent to any borrower
from entering into a below-market term loan agreement. It amounts to
an unconscionable acceleration or distortion of income. If the interest
represented by this original issue discount is deductible, it is deducted by
the borrower on a daily basis over the life of the loan. 51

44.

Id. at § 7872(b)(1)(A), (B).

45. Although interest rates in recent years have been quite low by historical standards, see,
e.g., Lee Ann Gjertsen, A Fed Rate Hike is Seen as Eventual Fixed Annuity Boon; Interest Rates,
FederalReserve Board; Industry Overview; 169 AM. BANKER No. 125, June 30, 2004, at 7. This
has not always been so during the life of I.R.C. § 7872.
46. I.R.C. § 7872(f(2).
47. Id. at § 7872 (b)(2)(B).
48. See id at § 1272(a).
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-7(a)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33563 (proposed Aug. 20, 1985).
50. I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1).
51. See id. at § 163(e).
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B. Exceptions to the Application of§ 7872for Certain Below-Market
Loans
1. Gift Loans
Section 7872 does not apply to any gift loan directly between
individuals on any day on which the aggregate amount of loans between
such individuals is not more than $10,000.52 This exception does not
apply to the extent that any such loans are used to purchase or carry
income producing assets.53 Under another special rule pertaining to gift
loans, there is no retransfer of forgone interest from lender to borrower
unless the borrower has net investment interest. 54 This exception does
not apply to any loan on any day on which the aggregate amount of
loans between borrower and lender exceeds $100,000. 5' This special
rule does not apply where one of the principal purposes of a loan is the
avoidance of any federal tax.56
2. Compensation-Related and Corporation-Shareholder Loans
In the case of compensation-related and corporation-shareholder
loans, § 7872 does not apply to any day on which the aggregate
outstanding amount of loans do not exceed $10,000. 57 This exception
also is inapplicable to any loan where one of the principal purposes of
the interest arrangements is to avoid federal tax 8
3. Loans to Qualified Continuing Care Facilities
Section 7872 also exempts loans to continuing care facilities.

59

The

52. Id. at § 7872(c)(2)(A).
53. Id. at § 7872(c)(2)(B).
54. Id. at § 7872(d). Net investment income has the same meaning as it does under I.R.C. §
163(d)(4), viz., the excess of investment income over investment expenses.
55. Id. at § 7872(d)(1).
56. Id. at § 7872(d)(1)(B).
57. Id. at § 7872(c)(3)(A).
58. Id. at § 7872(c)(3)(B). Under Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(e), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553,
33561, tax avoidance is a principal purpose of the interest arrangements of a loan if: "[A] principal
factor in the decision to structure the transaction as a below-market loan (rather than, for example,
as a market interest rate loan and a payment by the lender to the borrower) is to reduce the federal
tax liability of the borrower or the lender or both." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(e), 50 Fed. Reg.
33553, 33561 (Aug. 20, 1985). The purpose for making the loan itself is irrelevant in determining
the principal purpose of the interest arrangement and, hence, applicability of the exception. See id.
59. I.R.C. § 7872(g).
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amount of such an exempted loan, originally fixed at $90,000,60 has

risen by adjustment for inflation. 6' This exception applies to any loan
made to a continuing care facility pursuant to a continuing care contract
if the lender or the lender's spouse has attained age sixty-five before the
close of the calendar year such loan is outstanding. 62 A continuing care
contract is a written agreement between an individual and a continuing
care facility under which the individual or his or her spouse may use the
facility for their lives.63 A continuing care facility is a facility designed
to provide services under continuing care contracts, substantially all of
the residents of which are covered by continuing care contracts.6 4
4. Exceptions Created by Regulation
Temporary 65 and Proposed Regulations 66 contain a list of loans
exempted from § 7872. Most of the exemptions in the temporary and
proposed regulations are the same. 67 Both the Temporary 68 and the
60. Id. at § 7872(g)( 2 ).
61. Id. at § 7872(g)(5)(B). For 2005 the amount is $158,100. See Rev. Rul. 2004-108, 200447 I.R.B. 853.
62. Id. at § 7872 (g)(1).
3
63. Id. at § 7872(g)( ). The contract must provide that the individual or his or her spouse will
first reside in a separate, independent unit and then will be provided with such long term and skilled
nursing care as the health of either requires and that there be no additional substantial payment if
either require increased personal care services or long-term and skilled nursing care. Id.
64. Id. at § 78 72 (g)( 4 ). It does not include any facility of a type which is traditionally
considered a nursing home. Id. at § 7872 (g)(4)(C).
65. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T (1985).
66. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5, 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33561 (Aug. 20, 1985).
67. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1-7872-5(b) lists as exempt:
(1) loans made available by the lender to the general public on the same terms and
conditions and which are consistent with the lender's customary business practices; (2)
accounts or withdrawable shares with a bank or credit union made in the ordinary course
of business; (3) acquisitions of publicly traded debt obligations for an amount equal to
the public trading price at the time of acquisition; (4) loans by a life insurance company
in the ordinary course of its business to its insured, under a loan right contained in a life
insurance policy and in which the case surrender values are used as collateral; (5) loans
subsidized by federal, state, or municipal governments which are made available under a
program of general application to the public; (6) employer relocation loans that meet the
requirements of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 7872-5(c)(1); (7) obligations as to which interest is
exempt under § 103; (8) obligations of the United States government; (9) loans to a
charitable organization unless the aggregate of the lender's loans to such organizations
during the taxable year exceeds $10,000; (10) certain loans to or from foreign persons
meeting the requirements of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5(c)(2); (11) loans made by a
private foundation the primary purpose of which is to accomplish one or more of the
charitable purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B); (12) intercorporate loans made prior to
July 1, 1986, under former § 1.482-2 of the regulations (superseded by T.D. 8204, 19882 C.B. 246); (13) for periods prior to July 1, 1986, all money, securities, and property
received by a futures commissioner merchant or by a clearing organization to margin,
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Proposed Regulations 69 sternly provide that if a taxpayer structures a
transaction to fit within one of the regulation exemptions and one of the
principal purposes of structuring the transaction is the avoidance of
federal tax, then the transaction will be characterized as a tax avoidance
loan under § 7872(c)(1)(D), thereby vitiating the exemption. Of the
explanation in both the
regulation exemptions, three receive 7fuller
7 ° and Proposed Regulations. 1
Temporary
Both the Temporary and Proposed Regulations exempt mortgage or
bridge7 2 loans for employees relocated by the needs of the employer.73
Under the Proposed Regulations, a mortgage loan must be a demand
loan or a term loan, the benefits of which are not transferable by the
employee and which are conditioned on the future performance of
substantial services by the employee. Further, the employee must certify
that he or she expects to be entitled to and will itemize deductions for
each year the loan is outstanding, and the loan agreement must require
that the proceeds be used only to purchase the new residence of the
employee.7 4 With respect to bridge loans, the loan agreement must meet
the above conditions and the agreement must provide that the loan is
payable in full within fifteen days of the sale of employee's former
principal residence, the principal amount of all such loans may not
exceed the employer's reasonable estimate of the amount of the
employee's equity in his or her former residence, and such residence is
75
not converted to business or investment use.
guarantee or secure contracts for future delivery on or subject to the rules of a qualified
board or exchange or to purchase, margin, guarantee or secure options contracts traded
on or subject to the rules of a qualified board or exchange, and all money accruing to
account holders as the result of such futures and options contracts; (14) loans where the
taxpayer can show that the below-the-market interest arrangements have no significant
effect on any federal tax liability of the lender or the borrower, as described in Prop.
Treas. Regs. § 1-7872-5(c)(3); and (15) loans described in regulations promulgated
under what is now § 7872(h)(1)(C) pertaining to any class of transactions the interest
arrangements of which have no significant effect on any federal tax liability of the lender
or borrower.
Id
68. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(a)(2) (1985).
69. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5(a)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33561 (Aug. 20, 1985).
70. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(c) (1985).
71. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5(c), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33562 (Aug. 20, 1985).
72. See id. at § 1.7872-5(c)(1)(ii). Bridge loans refer to loans that enable a relocated
employee to purchase a new residence before selling his or her previous residence. Id.
73. The necessary relationship to employment is indicated by reference in the regulations to
I.R.C. § 217. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(c)(1)(i), (ii) (1985) and Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.7872-5(c)(i), (ii), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33562 (Aug. 20, 1985).
74. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5(c)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33562 (Aug. 20, 1985).
75. Id. at § 1.7872-5(c)(ii).
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The Temporary 76 and Proposed 77 Regulations provide that certain
loans involving foreign persons may be exempt from § 7872. Loans
between foreign persons are exempt except to the extent that the interest
income imputed to the foreign lender would be effectively connected
with the conduct of a United States trade or business.78 A loan, other
than a compensation-related or a corporation-shareholder loan, by a
foreign lender to a U.S. citizen who is not a C Corporation is exempt to
the extent the interest income imputed to the foreign lender would not be
effectively connected with the conduct of a United States trade or
79
business.
Finally, the Temporary 8° and Proposed 8' Regulations elaborate on
the exemption for loans without significant tax effect on the lender or the
borrower. The factors that give rise to this exemption are: whether the
items of income and deduction generated offset each other; the amount
of such items; the cost to the taxpayer of complying with the provisions
of § 7872 and any non-tax reasons to structure the transaction as a
below-market loan rather than a loan with an interest rate equal to or
greater than the applicable federal rate; and a payment by the lender to
the borrower. 82 The Temporary and Proposed Regulations contain no
83
guidance for weighing these factors.
C. RetroactiveApplication of§ 7872
If the interest provided with respect to a loan is subsequently
waived, cancelled, or forgiven, and such loan is one to which § 7872
would have been applied had it been made without interest, the waiver
does not include in substantial part the loan principal and a principal part
of the waiver is to confer a benefit on the borrower such as to pay
compensation or make a gift or corporate distribution, such waiver,
cancellation, or forgiveness is treated as if the interest had been paid to
the lender and then retransferred by the lender to the borrower.8 4 This
reversal of the scheme of transferring the forgone interest falls under §
76. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(c)(2) (1985).
77. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5(c)(2), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33562 (Aug. 20, 1985).
78. See id. at § 1.7872-5(c)(2)(ii) and I.R.C. § 864(c).
79. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5(c)(2)(i), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33562 (Aug. 20, 1985) and
I.R.C. § 864(c). See also Lawrence Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAX L. REV. 9,
228 (1986).
80. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(c)(3) (1985).
81. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5(c)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33562 (Aug. 20, 1985).
82. Id.
83. See Lokken, supra note 79, at 220.
84. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-11 (a), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33566 (Aug. 20, 1985).
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7872(a). It would appear that the transfer of accrued interest would in
any case be made on the day of waiver or cancellation. The further
transfer of interest from that time would depend on whether the loan is a
demand or a term loan.
D. ReportingRequirements of Borrower and Lender
The Proposed Regulations prescribe reporting rules for the parties
to below-market loans under § 7872. 85 The lender must attach a
statement to his or her return listing the name, address, and taxpayer
identification number of each borrower, the amount of imputed interest
income and the amount and character of any item deductible by reason
of § 7872 attributable to each borrower, and the mathematical
assumptions used for computing the amounts imputed under § 7872.86
The borrower also must attach a statement to his or her return
providing information that parallels the information the lender must
provide. 87 In the case of the employee-recipient of a compensationrelated loan or an individual recipient of a gift loan, the requirement that
the recipient provide the mathematical assumptions for the imputation of
interest would often be a surreal imposition.8 8

III. WHY CONGRESS ENACTED § 7872: THE DEAN ERA
A. Dean and Income Taxes
The enactment of § 7872 marked a legislative victory for the IRS
that it had been unable to win in the courts. 89 No doubt the struggle with
respect to below-market loans fared so badly for the government because
it took up the cudgel fairly late in the history of the tax law. In 1955, the
85. Seeid at§ 1.7872-11(g).
86. See id at § 1.7872- 11(g)(1).
87. See id.at § 1.7872-11 (g)(2).
88. For example, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-12 provides an "approximate" method for the
"convenience" of the taxpayer, for calculating the amount of interest that must be provided for a
$100,000 loan for four months in order to meet the assumed applicable federal rate often percent.
It is expressed as: $100,000 x [(.1012) x (4/6)] - $3,333.33. See id. at § 1.7872-12(d), Example 2.
Requiring familiarity with such regulations on the part of unsophisticated taxpayers appears to
stretch the familiar maxim "ignorantia legis neminem excusat" (ignorance of the law is no excuse)
as far as it can be stretched. Indeed, it appears intended simply to discourage taxpayers from
resorting to such loans.
89. See Phillip J. Closius & Douglas K. Chapman, Below Market Loans: From Abuse to
Misuse-A Sports Illustration,37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 484,496-98 (1987) (discussing the passage
of § 7872 as a legislative response to courts' unwillingness to apply income tax liability to belowmarket loans).
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IRS ruled: "The mere making available of money does not result in
realized income to the payee or a deduction to the payor." 90 This was
the position of the government, at least concerning income taxes,
"[f]rom the inception of the tax law in 1913... .,91 That position
changed in Dean v. Commissioner.92 The controversy in Dean, the Tax
Court's resolution thereof in favor of the taxpayers, and the
government's struggle to have Dean overturned provide insight into the
problem that Congress must necessarily have understood that it was
redressing in enacting § 7872.
In Dean, the original dispute between taxpayers and the IRS
concerned whether the taxpayers were permitted to deduct interest on
loans on insurance policies that they had irrevocably assigned to their
children. 93 By way of amended answer, the government asserted another
deficiency concerning the tax years involved.
The taxpayers had received large interest-free loans in the tax years
at issue from a corporation in which they were the sole shareholders.94
In its amended answer, the government asserted that the taxpayers owed
tax on "interest" for the loan balances at
what it contended was the
95
Delaware legal interest rate of six percent.
The government's assertion was at odds with its earlier position
concerning the tax consequences of interest-free loans.96 According to
the Tax Court in Dean, this change in position was instigated by a
suggestion in dictum by the Tax Court in unrelated litigation between
the IRS and the same taxpayers.97 Although the suggestion had little
bearing on the outcome of the earlier litigation, it had a momentous

90. Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23.
91. Hardee v. U.S., 708 F.2d 661, 663 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
92. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
93. The court held that such interest was not deductible. Id. at 1085.
94. For example, from January 11, 1955 to December 31, 1955, the amount of such loans held
by taxpayer J. Simpson Dean was $223,861.56. Id. at 1088. From January 1, 1956 to December 31,
1956 it was $357,293.41. Id. For the period January 1, 1955 to December 31, 1955, the amount of
such loans to taxpayer Pauline du Pont Dean was $1,832,764.71. Id. For the period January 1,
1956 to December 31, 1956, it was $2,205,804.66. Id.
95. Id. at 1087. This amounted to total deficiencies for both taxpayers of $224,978.28. Id. at
1083.
96. See id. at 1089.
97. Id. The other case was also Dean v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 281 (1960). The
issue in that case was the value of closely held stock that had been given by taxpayers to trusts for
their children. Dean, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 281. With respect to the stock's dividend paying
capabilities, an issue in its valuation, the court stated: "Viewed realistically, the lending of over two
million dollars to petitioners without interest might be looked upon as a means of passing on
earnings (certainly potential earnings) of [the lender corporation] in lieu of dividends, to the extent
of a reasonable interest on such loans." Id. at 288.
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impact on tax jurisprudence for nearly twenty-five years, and beyond.
In changing its position concerning the tax consequences of
interest-free loans, the government focused on cases that held rent-free
uses of corporate property constituted dividend income to taxpayershareholders.9 8 Under I.R.C. § 316, a distribution to a shareholder is a
dividend to the extent of earnings and profits. 99 In citing these decisions
concerning gratuitous use of property other than money, the government
essentially asserted that a corporation's money should be treated the
same as any other property of a corporation made available to a
shareholder at less than market value.
On the face of things, the IRS's argument has merit. Allowing a
taxpayer who controls a corporation with undistributed earnings and
profits to have the use of such profits without the intervening taxable
event of a dividend frustrates, or at least permits the delay, of the Code's
scheme of taxing corporate income to corporation and the shareholder.100
The Commissioner's contention did not convince the Tax Court,
which identified only a "superficial resemblance" to cited cases.'0 1 The
court distinguished money from property other than money for this
purpose on the basis that if the shareholders had to borrow the money
10 2
from a lender who charged interest, the interest would be deductible.
The deductibility of interest to borrow money in other settings made all
the difference to the Tax Court's majority opinion: "We think this
circumstance differentiates the various cases relied upon by the
Commissioner, and perhaps explains why he has never taken this
position in any prior case."' 103 Noting that the court had denied an
interest deduction for interest-free loans, the court thought it equally
true
4
that an interest-free loan should result in no gain to the borrower.'
98. Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090. See, e.g., Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3rd Cir. 1951)
(rent-free use of corporation's house by shareholder); Silverman v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1061,
aff'd, 253 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1985) (payment of spouse's travel expenses by corporation), and
Frueauff v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934) (rent-free use of corporation's apartment).
99. 1.R.C. § 316 (a).
100. It must be noted that the ability of corporations to retain earnings and profits, which are
not reduced by loans to shareholders is not unlimited. Sections 531 and 541 impose respectively
accumulated earnings and personal holding company taxes on undistributed earnings in certain
circumstances. Id. at §§ 53 1, 541.
101. Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090.
102. See I.R.C. § 163(a). Prior to the enactment of§ 163(h) in 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat.
2246, which sharply restricts deduction of "personal" interest for individuals, interest in most
contexts was deductible for individuals.
103. Dean, 35 T.C. at 1090.
104. Id. (citing D. Loveman & Son Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 776 (1960);
Brantjen & Kluge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 416 (1960); Society Brand Clothes, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 18 T.C. 304 (1952); Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 364 (1946),
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There were two other opinions in Dean. A concurring opinion by
Judge Opper agreed that no deficiency should have been found, but
stated that "[c]ertainly the statement that 'an interest-free loan results in
no taxable gain to the borrower is much too broad a generalization to
make here."' 1 5 If he did not accept that proposition, it is difficult to
fathom why he would find no income under the circumstances.
Judge Opper's opinion did introduce a suggestion that if the
borrower used the loan proceeds to purchase or carry tax-exempt
obligations, the result would have been different. 10 6 This viewpoint,
which was also the basis of Judge Bruce's dissent, 0 7 was embodied in §
7872,108 but it never allowed the IRS to carry the day - to require a
taxpayer to report income in consequence of an interest-free or belowmarket loan'0 9 - until the adoption of § 7872.
For a significant amount of time after Dean, it appeared that the
government's assertion that the borrower in an interest-free or belowmarket loan had income was a dead letter. The IRS did not "nonacquiesce" in Dean until 1973.10

Following its non-acquiescence in Dean, the Service carried on an
extensive campaign to have Dean overruled. In this campaign, the
Commissioner enjoyed "a notable lack of success.""' Most of the cases
the Commissioner lost involved taxpayer shareholders who received
interest-free loans from closely held corporations. 1 2 On at least one
rev'd on other grounds, 162 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1947); Combs Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 41
B.T.A. 339 (1940); A. Backus, Jr. & Sons v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 590 (1927)).
105. Dean, 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring).
106. Under I.R.C. § 265(a)(2), interest to purchase or carry such obligations is not deductible
on the basis that allowing a deduction for expenses to produce tax-exempt income would amount to
a double benefit. See MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.33
(3d ed. 1988).
107. Judge Bruce lamented that the burden should have been placed on the taxpayers to show
that they would have been entitled to deduct interest on the loans had they been required to pay it.
Dean, 35 T.C. at 1092 (Bruce, J., dissenting).
108. Under § 7872(a)(l)(B), the borrower retransfers interest to the lender. I.R.C. § 7872.
This is deductible "to the same extent as interest actually due on the loan from the borrower." See
H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, at 1012 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1984-3 C.B. vol. 2 at 267. Under §
7872(b)(2), the excess of the amount loaned over the present value of all payments due under the
loan is treated as original issue discount. 1.R.C. § 7872. Under I.R.C. § 163(e), original issue
discount is allocable to a taxable year of an issuer (borrower) if "allowable a deduction" to the
issuer. Id. at § 163.
109. See Hardee v. U.S., 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983), discussed infra notes 151-63, and
Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981), discussed infra notes 117-25.
110. See1973-2C.B. 4.
I 1. Parks v. Commissioner, 686 F.2d 408, 409 (6th Cir. 1982).
112. See id.; Baker v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 11 (2nd Cir. 1982); Martin v. Commissioner,
649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1981); Suttle v.
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occasion, the Tax Court did concede the incongruity of treating the free
use of corporate money by shareholders differently from free use of
other corporate property." 3 In a few cases, the Service's argument
appeared to be based on treating 14the interest-free loan as compensation,
rather than a corporate dividend.
In Marsh v. Commissioner, the court confronted a situation that
appears unique in Dean-era jurisprudence." 5 The taxpayer was a
member of a group that was exploring for natural gas. A company that
wished to acquire natural gas advanced funds to the taxpayer's group for
the purpose of financing the exploration. These funds were advanced
interest-free. The IRS contended that this created income to the
taxpayer. The unique aspect of the case was that there was no
employer/employee or corporation/shareholder relationship between
lender and borrower.
Notwithstanding absence of any such relationship between lender
and borrower, the government rather boldly asserted that "having cash
readily available is an economic benefit because the owner is entitled to
demand and receive interest as a condition of lending such capital to
another."116 The court rejected this IRS attempt to impute interest to the
taxpayer on account of the opportunity cost to the lender. Agreeing with
the taxpayer, the court stated:

Commissioner, 625 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1980); Trowbridge v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH)
1302 (1981); Estate of Leichtung, 40 T.C.M. 1118 (1980); Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1009
(1979), aff'dsub nom. Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
113. In Zager, the court stated concerning the Dean rule:
[T]here appear[s] to be but little difference between the interest-free use of corporate
funds and the rent-free [occupancy of corporate property by a stockholder or officer] that
had been held to constitute a tax benefit the fair value of which was includable in gross
income. Conceptually it [ I seem[s] that the same result should be reached in both types
of cases. Yet the fact that the Treasury had not theretofore - for some 48 years attempted to treat as income the benefits attributable to such interest-free loans was
highly troublesome. We searched for a distinction that would support the administrative
practice which had endured for so long a period. And we found a difference in that if the
taxpayer had undertaken to pay interest or rent, he would generally have been entitled to
a deduction for the payment of interest but not for rent.
Zager, 72 T.C. at 1011.
114. See Greenspun v. Commissioner, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982), discussed infra notes 12549; Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), affidsub nom.Martin v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d
1133 (5th Cir. 1981); Lisle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627 (1976). In Creel, since the
taxpayers' employer, which had made an interest-free loan to the taxpayer, had borrowed money at
interest in order to make the loan to the tax payment the court concluded that the employer paid
interest as the taxpayers' agent, discharging taxpayers' obligation. Creel, 72 T.C. 1173. While this
resulted in income to the taxpayers, they had offsetting interest deductions. Id.at 1180.
115. Marsh v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 317 (1979).
116. Id.at327.
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[T]he fact that the owner of capital is entitled to interest on a loan does
not mean that he must or actually does receive interest on money
loaned. The business transaction here involved was arrived at by
arm's length bargaining between two entirely
related parties, each of
1
whom had something the other wanted. 17
The government's attempt to impute income in Marsh went beyond
what would be permitted even under § 7872. It is not surprising that the
court chose to adhere to its Dean ruling, but the Tax Court and other
courts repeatedly did so, simply on the basis that Dean was so wellentrenched. 118 Some courts invoked United States v. Byrum"19 for the
proposition that courts are reluctant to disturb accepted interpretations of
20
tax law when it could have far-reaching consequences.
The dam protecting the Dean rule with respect to income taxation
of below-market loans never did break before the enactment of § 7872.
Three decisions near the end of the Dean regime that involved spirited
arguments within courts about the cogency of Dean, demonstrated the
futility of overturning it judicially and underscored the opportunity for
abuse through below-market loans. These decisions - Martin v.
Commissioner,121 Commissioner v. Greenspun,1 22 and Hardee v.
Commissioner123 - brought into focus both the urgency of the need for
change as well as the difficulties in making such change judicially.
In Greenspun, the facts of which appear below, 124 the Tax Court
refined Dean, acknowledging the obvious IRS contention that there
could be no deduction for interest under § 163 unless such interest was
paid.125 In a case where a taxpayer must report as income the economic
benefit associated with a low- or no-interest loan, "an exception to the
general rule of deductibility is both appropriate and necessary
to give
' 26
recognition to the economic realities of the transaction."'
Before the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision, the Fifth Circuit
endorsed Greenspun in Martin v. Commissioner, while reviewing three

117.

Id.

118. See Parks, 686 F.2d 408 (defer to Congress); Baker, 677 F.2d 11; Beaton, 664 F.2d 315;
Martin, 649 F.2d 1133; Trowbridge,41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1302.
119. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
120. See, e.g., Parks, 686 F.2d at 409; Beaton, 664 F.2d at 317.
121. 649 F.2d1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
122. 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982).
123. 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
124. See infra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
125. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 951.
126. Id.
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other Tax Court cases. 127 All three involved interest-free loans by
corporations to principal shareholders who were also directors and
salaried employees of the corporations.
The court rejected the
government's attempt to overrule Dean in a cryptic opinion. It described
the Dean rule as a fiction, entailing an assumption: "[T]hat the interestfree loan ipso facto does not produce benefits that under normal tax
regulation result in taxable income because128 the alleged benefit is
equalled by a comparable interest 'deduction."",
Martin is better known for the vigorous and colorful dissent of
Judge Goldberg, who castigated the majority's acquiescence in Dean as
a solution that "abdicates responsibility and begrudgingly accepts
error."' 129 Judge Goldberg viewed the Dean approach, in putting interestfree loans outside the scope of § 61, as doing great damage to that
section. 130 On the other hand, he found unjust the government's position
of charging the taxpayer with income in all 31
cases on account of failure of
the technical requirements for a deduction.'
While the government's unjust position was predicated on failure to
allow a deduction in any circumstance, the taxpayer's position was
predicated on two flaws: (1) that the taxpayer would always have an
offsetting deduction, 32 and thus, (2) that there is no reason for the
taxpayer to include the loan benefit in income, forcing him or her to
report the offsetting benefit under § 163.33 Judge Goldberg listed the
circumstances in which a taxpayer would not receive a deduction from
the payment of interest.' 34
127. Martin, 649 F.2d 1133.
128. Id. at 1133-34.
129. Id. at 1144 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
130. Judge Goldberg saw the evolving design of § 61 as taxing "any valuable economic benefit
which serves as a form of compensation to an employee or as a dividend to a shareholder." Id. at
1142. He felt that there could be little doubt that the free use of money provided by a corporation
should fall within the broad construction afforded by § 61. Id. at 1136.
131. Martin, 649 F.2d at 1139. Judge Goldberg viewed the government's argument with
respect to "the deduction side of the ledger" as based on the contention that interest must be "paid or
accrued" for a taxpayer to enjoy a deduction under § 163(a). Id. at 1142. The IRS argued that a
taxpayer who receives an interest-free loan neither pays nor accrues interest. Id. at 1136.
132. Id. at 1140-41.
133. Id.at 1141.
134. He noted that a taxpayer would receive no benefit with respect to interest unless he or she
itemizes deductions. Id. See also I.R.C. § 63. A taxpayer receives no deduction for interest
incurred to purchase or carry obligations the interest on which is wholly exempt from taxes, see id.
at § 265(a)(2), or a single premium life insurance, endowment or annuity contract. See id. at § 264.
He noted that deductions for interest are limited with respect to investment property, see id. at §
163(d), and may be denied with respect to sham transactions. Martin, 649 F.2d at 1141.
Judge Goldberg also noted that not including the economic benefit in gross income
distorted the availability of deductions dependent upon a percentage of adjusted gross income, such
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Judge Goldberg's middle ground, that a taxpayer-borrower of a
below-market loan incurs tax liability only to the extent interest income
exceeds a correlative deduction, was the view adopted by § 7872, at least
initially. The legislative history of § 7872 indicates a similar list of
circumstances in which interest would not be deductible for a
taxpayer. 35 The balance struck by Judge Goldberg and then Congress in
1984 was greatly skewed by the enactment of § 163(h) which sharply
restricts deduction of personal interest.
Although Greenspun at the appellate level did not involve the same
spirited debate about the Dean rule as Martin, such a discussion did
occur in the Tax Court. 36 The facts of Greenspun which, unlike most of
the other Dean progeny did not involve below-market loans from a
corporation to 137
its shareholders, presented the most alarming "abuse" of
rule.
Dean
the
The taxpayer, Mr. Greenspun, owned a newspaper and television
station in Las Vegas. In 1966, Howard Hughes moved to Las Vegas and
met Greenspun, where they became friends. Hughes had a telephone
installed in taxpayer's home so that Hughes' "alter ego," Robert Maheu,
could seek Greenspun's advice on Hughes' behalf. 138 In connection with
his acquisition of substantial assets in Las Vegas, Hughes sought to
acquire local radio, television, and newspaper interests. 39 Greenspun
refused to sell Hughes his newspaper but he did sell Hughes the
television station.1 40 Hughes knew that Greenspun needed money
because of a disastrous
fire that had occurred at Greenspun's newspaper
14 1
a few years before.

At about the same time as the sale of the television station in 1967,
42
Hughes' corporate "alter ego" agreed to loan Greenspun $4 million.
Initially, this loan was for a term of eight years at three percent
interest. "43 The rate of interest charged by banks for mortgages, etc. at

as medical deductions under § 213. Id. at 1142.
135. The Conference Report to I.R.C. § 7872, H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, lists § 163(d) and § 268
as denying deductions for interest in some circumstances. H.R. Rep. No. 98-861, at 1012 (1984)
(Conf. Rep.), reprintedin 1984-3 C.B. vol. 2 at 267.
136. Greenspun, 72 T.C. 931.
137. See id. at 952, n. 22.
138. Id. at 933.
139. Greenspun, 670 F.2d at 124.
140. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 935.
141. Id. at 933.
142. Id.at 935.
143. Id. at 935-36. In 1969 a note for 35 years was renegotiated between the parties. Id. at
943.
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the time of the loan would have been not less than six percent.'
Although Greenspun contended that he did not believe that the loan
from Hughes was in compensation for past services or services to be
rendered in the future,1 45 Hughes received a great deal of favorable
coverage in Greenspun's newspaper in its wake. 46 This editorial
support appears consistent with Hughes' plan,147which Maheu described
as keeping Greenspun "perpetually beholden.,
The government determined deficiencies in Greenspun's taxes of
$469,613.77 and $1,152,956.16 in 1967 and 1969 respectively, the years
in which the original and renegotiated notes were executed. 48 This
represented a totaling of the present values of the expected annual
savings over the terms of the loans. 149 Making the taxpayer account for
the economic benefit for the life of the loan on the date he or she
executes the loan is similar to the treatment of term loans under §
7872(b). 5 ° Dissenting in Martin, Judge Goldberg had brushed aside the
majority's concern about computing taxable income if Dean were
abandoned by asserting that "[h]aving determined the proper interest
rate, the cited difficulties of computation are reduced to a grade school
exercise in multiplication."''
As demonstrated by the computations
under the proposed regulations adverted to above, calculation of whether
a loan is below-market and the amount of imputed interest is not simply
a matter of grade school multiplication. 52 The Tax Court majority also
rejected the present value approach stating that
the benefit to the
153
taxpayer occurred ratably over the life of the loan.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that the loan and its favorable
terms were intended to compensate Greenspun for services and as an
144. Id. at 940.
145. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 936.
146. In editorials, Greenspun called Hughes "a legend in his own time," an "exceptional man,"
and "the world's greatest industrialist." Id. at 938. Greenspun contended that Hughes' presence in
Las Vegas had created a new favorable image of Las Vegas around the country. Id. at 939.
Greenspun, reversing an earlier position he had taken, testified before the Nevada Gaming Policy
Board supporting Hughes acquisition of two Las Vegas strip resorts. Id.
147. Id.at 935.
148. Greenspun, 670 F.2d at 124. According to the Tax Court, the amounts of the deficiencies
were $701,211 and $1,536,156 for 1967 and 1969 respectively. Greenspun, 72 T.C. at 940-41.
149. Greenspun,72 T.C. at 941.
150. Even Judge Nims, who dissented from the court's adherence to the Dean rule, would not
endorse the government's "present value" method of calculating the deficiencies. Id. at 958 (Nims,
J., dissenting).
151. Martin, 649 F.2d at 1144 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
152. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7272-12, -13,
and -14, 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33567-33570 (Aug. 20, 1985).
153. Greenspun,72 T.C. at 950-51.
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inducement concerning certain property transactions. 54 Nevertheless,
even though the court conceded that the Dean rule was "laden with some
potential for abuse," 155 it not only applied Dean, it rejected the need of a
taxpayer to comply literally with the requirements of § 163(a) in order to
make the economic benefit of the loan proceeds excludable.156 The
result appeared based,
in part, on the notion that the IRS should sleep in
1 57
made.
had
it
the bed
In a concurring opinion, Judge Goffe envisioned that overruling
Dean to the extent of requiring that the taxpayer demonstrate specifically
the applicability of an interest deduction in order not to have income
158
would require that the lender be deemed to have interest income.
in § 7872,
This, of course, is precisely the regime Congress adopted
59
except with respect to gift loans below a certain level.'
160
Greenspun presented a troubling application of the Dean rule.
Hughes and Greenspun found a way to compensate the latter without a
tax impact to Greenspun. Hughes, of course, did not receive a tax
deduction in conferring this benefit, although he received the rough
equivalent. To the extent he shifted funds from himself to Greenspun,
Hughes shifted any interest income pertaining to such funds away from
himself. With that cost, he purchased Greenspun's valuable services,
eliminating the tax for both parties. As such, it would probably be
regarded as either a tax-avoidance loan16 1 or a loan the interest
arrangements of which have a significant effect on the tax liability of the
lender or borrower 162 and subject to § 7872.
The last truly unsettling decision under the Dean regime was
Hardee v. United States.' 63 In this case, despite a promising beginning
in what was then the United States Court of Claims,' 64 the government's

154. Id. at 942. A sale of real property owned by Greenspun to Hughes for over $5,000,000,
the proceeds of which Greenspun wanted to use to repay Hughes' loan, apparently was never
consummated. Id. at 937.
155. Id. at 952, n.22.
156. Id.at951.
157. Id. at 952, n.22. The court stated: "[W]e think it is important to point out that respondent
has not aided his position by waiting approximately 13 years to publicly announce his disagreement
with the decision." Id.
158. Id.at 954 (Goffe, J., concurring).
159. See I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(A).
160. See Greenspun,72 T.C. at 957 (Nims, J., dissenting).
161. See I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(D).
162. See id at § 7872(c)(1)(E).
163. 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
164. Hardee v. United States, 82-2 USTC P9459 (Ct. Cl. 1982), rev'd, 708 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
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effort to overturn Dean in income tax cases reached its nadir.
In Hardee the taxpayer, who held a majority of the stock in a close
corporation that engaged in several business, borrowed money from the
corporation as he needed. He repaid it as he was able to do so. 16' At the
end of the two years at issue, 1972 and 1973, taxpayer's debt to the
corporation was over $500,000.166 To make matters worse, taxpayer
held tax-exempt municipal bonds valued at more than $500,000 in the
same years. 167 This permitted an inference that the taxpayer used his
borrowings to purchase or carry tax-exempt bonds. Dean had predicated
exclusion of the economic benefit of an interest-free loan to the
borrower on the availability of a deduction. No16deduction
is allowed for
8
borrowings to purchase or carry tax-free bonds.
The IRS asserted deficiencies against the taxpayer for 1973 and
169
1974 based on this borrowing, setting an interest rate at seven percent.
The Trial Division of the Court of Claims sweepingly rejected Dean and
its progeny determining170itself "not bound to honor existing views that it
considers to be wrong."'
The trial court held that the taxpayer had income on the basis of tax
hornbook principles. 171 The court rejected the theoretical availability of
an interest deduction as offsetting the economic benefit of the interestfree loan on the basis that deductions do not turn on "equitable
considerations," but rather depend upon "legislative
grace" and thus
172
obtain only where there is "clear provision therefor.'
The familiar principles upon which the trial court based its refusal
to follow Dean might have been as obvious to the Dean court and those
other courts that followed Dean. The victory of the government in

165. The Federal Circuit noted that the taxpayer deferred his salary until the end of the
corporation's fiscal year and then credited it to his account and gave a note to the corporation for the
balance due. Hardee, 708 F.2d at 662.
166. Id.at 663.
167. Hardee, 82-2 USTC at 84,656.
168. See I.R.C. § 265(2). Indeed, Judge Opper's concurring opinion in Dean referred to I.R.C.
§ 265(2). Dean, 35 T.C. at 1091 (Opper, J., concurring).
169. Hardee, 708 F.2d at 663. This interest rate was not contested by the taxpayer. Id.
170. Hardee, 82-2 USTC at 84,658.
171. See id. For example, the court relied on Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426
(1955) for the notion that gross income is to be broadly construed to tax all gains except those
specifically exempted. Id. It noted that the value of in-kind benefits are taxable to an employee or
shareholder to the same extent or cash, id. (citing Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945)),
and that the economic benefit realized through free use of corporate assets compels recognition of
income to the extent of the market value of that use. Id.
172. Id. at 84,659 (quoting Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating, 417 U.S. 134, 14849(1974)).
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Hardee was short-lived, however, as the Federal Circuit reversed. 173
The court was strongly influenced by the failure of the government to
take the position prior to Dean that an interest-free loan resulted in
income to the borrower 17 4 and by the failure of the Service to nonacquiesce in the result in
Dean until 1973, during one of the tax years for
75
1
involved.
taxpayer
the
The court side-stepped the problem of possible taxpayer use of loan
proceeds to purchase or carry tax-exempt bonds by ignoring Greenspun
and perhaps even Dean in stating:
[T]he accepted interpretation of the definition of taxable income does
not encompass the benefit of such an interest-free loan in the first
place. Thus, it is immaterial that no statutory authority exists for
imputing a deduction for imputed interest payments, or that no
statutory authority authorizes equal treatment for economically
equivalent transactions when one of76those transactions depends on the
ability to deduct interest payments.1
Even the two dissenting judges did not question the continued
application of Dean. Both opined that a taxpayer who used loan
proceeds to carry tax-exempt bonds should realize income. 177 Thus, by
the time of Hardee, the last circuit court opinion pertaining to the Dean
rule before the enactment of § 7872, even the theoretical requirement of
a deduction appeared in question.
The most obvious consequence of this state of affairs, at least in the
case law, was the ability of close corporations to bail out earnings to
employee/shareholders.
This had at least the temporary effect of
sidestepping corporate taxation at the shareholder level, and the
uncertainty, in the informality endemic to close corporations, that
"loans" would ever be repaid. Greenspun suggested the possibility of
tax-avoidance that involved a favorable interest rate as a quid pro quo
for some service. 178 For example, professional sports teams used belowmarket loans extensively to compensate highly paid athletes. 79 Hardee
left the IRS in full retreat and legislative relief was inevitable.

173. Hardee, 708 F.2d 661.
174. Id. at 663.
175. Id. at 663-64.
176. Id. at 665.
177. Id. at 668 (Markey, C.J., dissenting) and 669 (Kashiwa, J., dissenting).
178. Even in the absence of an employment relationship between borrower and lender,
payment in return for some service would ordinarily result in income for the person who provided
the service. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
179. Closius & Chapman, supra note 89, at 507.
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B. Below-Market Loans and the Gift Tax
Perhaps the most significant impetus for § 7872 was the Service's
significant victory in the gift tax arena in Dickman v. Commissioner,
where the Supreme Court held that the benefit inherent in an interestfree demand loan was a gift taxable to the lender. 80 This victory with
respect to the gift tax consequences of below-market loans did not come
all at once, at least with respect to demand loans.
The Tax Court held long before Dickman that a below-market term
loan could result in gift tax liability for the lender in Blackburn v.
Commissioner.18 1 The Tax Court's holding in Blackburn had the effect
of transforming into interest part of the principal on a note given by
"buyers" in a transaction that was part sale/part gift and treated the
interest component as part of the gift. The court's analysis was quite
cryptic. It simply cited the predecessor to the current § 2512(b), to the
effect that a transfer of property for less than adequate consideration in
money or money's worth entails a gift to the extent the value of the
property exceeds that of the consideration.182 As is true under § 7872
with respect to non-gift term loans 183 and the gift tax consequences of
gift loans, 184 Blackburn required the taxpayer making the gift to reckon
with the interest component at the time of the gift in the amount of the
difference between the face amount and the present value of the buyer's
obligation. In a sense, this represents a "bunching" into one year of a
transfer that in Blackburn occurred over thirty-four years and six
months. 185 Perhaps that is a practical necessity with a gift, since
spreading it out over the period over which the donees actually receive
the benefit of the transferred interest would
have made the multiple
86
transfers eligible for the gift tax exclusion.
180. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984). One commentator has contended that
I.R.C. § 7872 essentially codified Dickinan. See Michael D. Hartigan, From Dean to Crown to the
Tax Reform Act of 1984: Taxation of Interest-FreeLoans, 60 N.D. L. REV. 31, 58 (1984).
181. 20 T.C. 204 (1953). In that case, the taxpayer deeded land she contended was worth
$225,000 to her adult children in return for a promissory note in the amount of $172,517.65, the
taxpayer's basis in the land. Id. at 205. She reported a gift in the amount of $52,482.35. Id. The
government argued that the present value of the note, at four percent, the market rate on such loans,
was only $134,538.30. Id. at 206. The court upheld, adding the difference between the present
value and the face amount of the note to the amount subject to the gift tax as a consequence of the
transaction. Id. at 207.
182. Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 1002.
183. I.R.C. § 7872(b).
184. Id. at § 7872(d)(2).
185. Blackburn, 20 T.C. at 206.
186. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (excluding from gift tax the first $10,000 transferred from donor to
donee).
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The government's attempts to extend the rule of Blackburn 1to
87
interest free demand loans were rejected in Johnson v. United States
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
and in Crown v. Commissioner by both the Tax Court and the Seventh
Circuit. 188

In Johnson, the taxpayers made large demand loans to their
children. 89 The government contended that the taxpayers had made
gifts to their children in the amount of the average annual unpaid
balances multiplied by three and a half percent. 90 The court treated the
case as one of first impression and rejected the government's attempt to
impute interest to agreements between taxpayers and their children that
did not provide for interest.' 9 1 The court appeared to view the
government's assertion of tax on the interest component as the
imposition of tax upon an opportunity cost of the loans by taxpayers to
their children. The court stridently rejected the legitimacy of such an
impost:
The time has not yet come when a parent must suddenly deal at arm's
length with his children when they finish their education and start out
in life. There is no legal requirement, express or implied, to charge
them interest on money advanced to them at that stage, whether it be to
open a law office and hang out a shingle, or to go into the oil business
on a substantial scale, or to begin life on their own in some other
way. 192
In this era of pervasive discontent with the tax code and radical
proposals to overhaul it, 193 the Johnson court's sentiment resonates
perhaps more strongly than at the time it was uttered. Nevertheless, the
refusal to impose gift or income tax consequences 94
on gift loans allowed
avoidance.1
tax
income
of
means
a
as
serve
them to
Johnson did not refer to Dean, but the latter's spill-over effect may

187.
188.
189.

Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex, 1966).
Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977), aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978).
Johnson, 254 F. Supp. at 73.

190. Id. at 73.
191. Id. at 77. The court did not view the taxpayers as using the interest-free nature of the
loans to deplete their taxable estate since the principal amounts of the loans remained includable in
the estate. See Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
192. Johnson, 254 F. Supp. at 77.
193. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Commission Proposes Changes in Tax System, WASH. POST, Nov.
2, 2005, at Al.
194. See William D. Samson & Brian D. Thom, The 1984 Deficit Reduction Act's Impact on
Low-Interest Loans: Solving the Mystery of Phantom Interest Payments, 33 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 681,
681-82 (1985).
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be seen in Crown.' 95 In Crown, the taxpayer, in a partnership with his
two brothers, made approximately $18 million in interest-free loans to
trusts for the benefit of the partners' children and other close relatives.
The Commissioner assessed a deficiency in the amount of
$1,086,407.75, representing six percent interest on the daily balance of
outstanding loans for that year. 196 As in Johnson, the government's
assertion of gift tax was an excise on the opportunity cost of the amount
by which income from the principal, had it not been loaned at no
interest, might have augmented the estate. 97 The Tax Court rejected the
government's rationale in much the same tone as had Johnson:
[O]ur income tax system does not recognize unrealized earnings on
accumulations of wealth and no taxpayer is under any obligation to
continuously invest his money for a profit. The opportunity cost of
either letting one's money remain idle or suffering a loss from an
because a profit could have
unwise investment is not taxable merely
198
been made from a wise investment.
Notwithstanding the confidence with which the courts in Johnson
and then Crown asserted this proposition, § 7872 mandates that a donortaxpayer enjoy the opportunity to receive income with respect to gift
loans under certain circumstances. 199
In a manner characteristic of the income tax cases under Dean, the
court noted that "[t]he courts have uniformly rejected every attempt by
the making of non-interestthe Internal Revenue Service to subject
200
bearing loans to income or gift taxes.,
The Seventh Circuit addressed the government's argument for
inclusion of demand loans within the scope of the gift tax in more detail
than the Tax Court. It viewed the government as arguing that the
taxpayer's transfer of money for a promise that was worth less than the
amount transferred was an unequal exchange within the meaning of §
2512(b). 20 ' Alternatively, it contended that there was an outright gift of
a property right, i.e., the right to use the money for an indefinite

195. Crown, 67 T.C. 1060.
196. Crown, 585 F.2d at 234.
197. Id. at 242. The government relied on Rev. Rul. 73-61, 1973-1 C.B. 408, which had
rejected Johnson. Id.
198. Crown, 67 T.C. at 1063-64 (emphasis in original).
199. Under I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1), if loans between lender and borrower are more than $100,000,
there is a retransfer of forgone interest to the lender even if the borrower does not have net
investment income. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)
200. Crown, 67 T.C. at 1064.
201. Crown, 585 F.2d at 238-39.
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period.2 °2
As to the unequal exchange, the court saw anomalies in the
calculation of the value of the borrowers' obligations.2 3 As to the IRS's
argument that the taxpayer had made an outright gift of a property right,
the court stated that it saw no authority "that the recipient of a loan
payable 4on demand has a legally protectible interest vis-a-vis the
lender.

, 20

The court then addressed what it called a "third variant" of the
government's argument - that the gift begins at the time the loan is
made and continues as long as the lender refrains from demanding
repayment.20 5 The court stated that the notion that mere use of property
can be characterized as a transfer of property "implies a broader concept
of what constitutes a property
right under the gift tax laws than has
20 6
heretofore been recognized.,

Unlike the sad saga of its struggle to overturn Dean, however, the
government's battle to impose gift tax consequences on interest-free
demand loans had a happy ending - at least for the government. In
Dickman v. Commissioner, the Supreme Court held that interest-free
demand loans may constitute taxable gifts of the reasonable value of the
use of the money lent.20 7
In that case, the taxpayers lent substantial sums at no interest to
their son and a closely held corporation. The IRS determined that the
loans resulted in taxable gifts to the extent of the value of the use of the
funds lent. In valuing the gifts, the Commissioner multiplied the loan
balances at the end of the quarters that loans were outstanding by interest
rates from six to nine percent per annum.208 The Tax Court followed
Crown,209 but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 210 The conflict between the

circuits allowed the Supreme Court to resolve the issue of whether
demand loans could result in a taxable gift to the lender.
The Court did not share the misgivings of the Tax Court and the
202. Id. at 239.
203. Id. at 238-39. The court stated that the government, in valuing the borrowers' obligation,
failed to discount the interest of the time subsequent to the loan date so as to determine the value of
the exchange at that date as required by § 2512(b). Id. at 239. The court also stated that in valuing
the obligation, the Commissioner, without basis, assumed that it would be in effect for the entire
period for which it sought to impute interest. Id.
204. Crown, 585 F.2d at 239.
205. Id. at 239-40.
206. Id. at 240 (footnote omitted).
207. Dickman, 465 U.S. 330.
208. Id. at 332 n.2.
209. Dickman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 620 (1980).
210. Dickman v. Commissioner, 690 F.2d 812 (11 th Cir. 1982).
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Seventh Circuit in Crown about whether the benefit entailed in a loan of
an indefinite term might be encompassed by § 2511(a). The Court
stated: "[T]he gift tax was designed to encompass all transfers of
property and property rights having significant value." 21' The Court
stated that the uncertain tenure of the interest conveyed to the borrower
"may reduce its value, but it does not undermine its status as
property. '212
In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that the relinquishing of
dominion and control over the transferred property required by the
regulations under § 2511213 does not take place at the making of the
loan.2 14 It insisted, however, that "[a]s time passes without a demand for
repayment... the transferor allows the use 215
of the principal to pass to the
transferee, and the gift becomes complete.,
The Court adverted to the importance of taxing such transfers:
A substantial no-interest loan from parent to child creates significant
tax benefits for the lender quite apart from the economic advantages to
the borrower. This is especially so when an individual in a high
income tax bracket transfers income-producing property to an
individual in a lower income tax bracket, thereby reducing the taxable
income of the high-bracket taxpayers216at the expense, ultimately, of all
other taxpayers and the Government.
The Court's action was thus necessary to prevent tax avoidance.
The Court did not share the concern of the courts in Crown and
Johnson about the inappropriateness of imposing a tax on a taxpayer's
opportunity costs: "The gift tax is an excise tax on transfers of property;
allowing dollars to be idle involves no transfer. If the taxpayer chooses
not to waste the use value of money, however, but217instead transfers the
use to someone else, a taxable event has occurred.,
This refutation of the corollary of the taxpayer's right to leave
money under the mattress provides an underpinning for treating the
forgone interest as a transfer to the borrower. Section 7872 goes a
significant step beyond the reasoning of Dickman when, in certain
211.

Dickman, 465 U.S. at 334 (emphasis in original). The Court analogized the scope of the

gift tax to that of § 61 under Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), implying

that it encompassed any benefit transferred for less than money's worth unless there is an exemption
from the tax. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 349 n.4.
212. Id. at 337.
213.
214.

See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1983).
Dickman, 465 U.S. at 338 n.7.

215. Id.
216. Id. at 339.
217. Id. at 340 (emphasis in original).
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218
circumstances, there is a transfer back to the lender from the borrower.
Not only can the taxpayer not avoid the gift, he or she cannot avoid
income.
The Court recognized the hazards of permitting the IRS to put
219
financial matters among family members on a business-like footing.
It stated that if the Service attempted to subject parents allowing their
adult children the free use of cars or vacation 22
cottages
to taxation, "there
0
will be time enough to deal with such a case.
The task of creating a method of valuing no or low-interest loans in
the absence of statutory guidance would seem to be a tricky one. The
Court, though, did not appear to see it that way, stating simply: "[I]t is
sufficient for the Commissioner to establish that a certain yield could
readily be secured and that the1 reasonable value of the use of the funds
22

can be reliably ascertained.",

In light of the detailed provisions in the Proposed Regulations for
determining whether a loan is subject to § 7872 as a below-market loan
and in determining the amount of forgone interest transferred,22 2 the
Court seemed remarkably unconcerned about the mechanics of
calculating taxable gifts in the absence of a statute.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Powell took the Court to task on
this account.223
It noted that in the three cases in which the
Commissioner had taken the position with respect to gift tax liability that
the Court adopted in Dickman, he had posited three different theories for
valuing the interest rate to determine the "use-value of the borrowed
money., 224 Of course, the adoption of the applicable federal rate as a
benchmark in § 7872 addresses these concerns, although the calculations
for term loans may be complex.
218. See I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1).
219. See Dickman, 465 U.S. at 340-42.
220. 1d. at 341.
221. Id. at 345 n.14.
222. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-12, -13, -14, 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33567-70 (Aug. 20,
1985).
223. See Dickman, 465 U.S. at 345 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
224. Id. at 350 (Powell, J., dissenting). In Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.
Tex. 1966), the IRS computed the amount of gift specified in regulations for valuing annuities, life
estates, etc. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1983). In Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977),
aff'd, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), the Service used a rate that it considered reasonable under the
circumstances. In Dickman, noted Justice Powell, the Service urged the rate under I.R.C. § 6621 for
interest due on underpayments or refunds of taxes. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 350 n.9. Justice Powell
also noted that in a recently docketed Tax Court case, La Rosa v. Commissioner, No. 29632-82
(Tax. Ct. filed Dec. 22, 1982), the Service proposed a separate rate for each month the loan was
outstanding provided by an expert "who relied on estimated fair market interest rates considering
the credit-worthiness of the borrowers." Dickman, 465 U.S. at 350 n.9.
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Justice Powell also criticized the Court for departing from "a longstanding principle of gift tax law, supported by IRS inaction and judicial
opinion ' '225 after justified reliance on freedom from gift taxation for
interest free loans.226 This concern, too, has been alleviated by the
enactment of § 7872.
Justice Powell was most troubled, however, by "the scope of [the
Court's] new reading of the statute," which he saw as not limited to
interest-free use of money.2 27
He saw the Court's ruling as
encompassing "rent-free use of a home by a child over the age of
minority," or to the loan of a car for a brief period.22 8 By limiting the
application of § 7872 to loans
of money, Congress has largely
229
sidestepped this problem as well.
Nonetheless, there seems an overriding concern on the part of
Justice Powell that the Court's approval of gift taxation of interest-free
loans will create headaches for a new class of taxpayers 230 and the
potential for abuse by the IRS because of the broad power conferred on
the Service and the Court's assumption that the "Service will exercise
the power conferred on it in a reasonable way."2 3'
As noted earlier, § 7872 imposes the burden of reporting and
explaining the tax implications of below-market loans on all of the
participants thereto.232 Congress has also given what amounts to a carte
blanche to apply § 7872 to loans that may affect federal tax liability of
lender or borrower.233 As discussed below, the IRS has exercised this
broad authority. 234 Justice Powell believed the sweeping authority given
the Commissioner in Dickman could be abused. 235 Experience with §
7872 has shown that there is basis for similar concern with
administration of that law under the broad powers given the IRS.

225. Id. at 347.
226. Id. at 348.
227. Id. at 349.
228. Id. at 350.
229. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33557 (Aug. 20, 1985).
230. As Justice Powell stated: "[T]he net result of the Court's decision will be to create
potential tax liability for many taxpayers who have never been subject to it before, and create legal,
tax accounting, and return filing nightmares for many others." Dickman, 465 U.S. at 352.
231. Id.at351.
232. See supra Section lI.D. This requirement is particularly remarkable with respect to splitdollar arrangements to purchase insurance. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15 (2003). Split-dollar
arrangements occur when two individuals agree to share premium payments, but the life insurance
is written only on the life of one. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (7th ed. 2004).
233. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(E).
234. See infra Section IV.
235. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 351.
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C. The End of the Dean Era
Whether the Supreme Court's resolution of the issue of the gift tax
consequences of interest-free loans in the government's favor would
have spilled over into the income tax, no one can say. Congress shortly
thereafter adopted § 7872. The "problems" that spurred adoption of §
7872 were quite apparent in the case law of the previous two and a half
decades. Most prominently, shareholders were able to obtain large
interest-free loans from (usually closely-held) corporations. 6 This
frustrated the Code's scheme of double taxation of corporate income.
Taxpayers of substantial means, denizens of high marginal brackets,
"loaned" substantial amounts to others (often family members) in lower
tax brackets. This alternatively frustrated the gift tax or the grantor trust
provisions intended to limit intra-family tax avoidance. Less obvious, in
the case law anyway, but a significant matter, was the use of interest-free
loans as a substitute for taxable compensation. 237
Section 7872 addressed all of these issues, but also gave the IRS
power to address below-market loans in contexts that did not appear to
raise issues of tax avoidance in the frequent litigation in the Dean era.
In a number of respects, § 7872 permits the IRS, at its discretion, to
compel taxpayers to deal with each other in accordance with the tax
collector's idea of what is a commercially reasonable, arm's length
manner.
Granting such power to the IRS might well have been in accord
with notions of tax policy that ran rampant during the 1980s. There
seems a good deal less willingness today to permit the IRS to impose
intricate regulation of business dealings. It is time to look at how § 7872
has functioned in its two decades of existence and to ponder whether the
complexity embodied in the original enactment and in regulations that,
for the most part, have not become final, is warranted. The remainder of
this article will assess the experience with § 7872 in the judicial and
administrative realms and then propose changes aimed at eliminating
unwarranted complexity in the law of below-market loans.

236. See Lokken, supra note 79, at 203-04 (discussing the adoption of § 7872 as a remedy to
corporations' ability to give stockholders corporate income in the form of a loan without paying
taxes on the income).
237. Before the enactment of § 7872, below-market loans were widely used by professional
sports teams as part of player compensation. Closius & Chapman, supra note 89, at 507.
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IV. How § 7872 HAS FUNCTIONED SINCE ITS ENACTMENT
A. Section 163(h)-Congress Gives § 7872 Sharper Teeth-DidIt
Really Mean To?

In the Tax Reform Act of 1986,238 Congress disrupted an
equilibrium between taxpayers and the tax collector that existed with
respect to most of § 7872. It enacted § 163(h) which generally denies
the taxpayer a deduction for personal interest. 239 After 1986, individual
taxpayers had to meet one of the exceptions to § 163(h) in order to
deduct interest.
It does not appear that Congress considered the effects of § 163(h)
on § 7872, but they are significant.24 ° Congress' justification for this
measure, i.e., the elimination of a disincentive to saving,24 1 to the extent
that it was not a rationalization for the sacrifice of some popular
242
deductions in exchange for a historic rate reduction in the 1986 Act,
sounds remarkably paternalistic in the less tax-abiding twenty-first
century. 243 Whatever its motivation, the action by Congress to curb
consumer debt does not appear to have been successful, as consumers
have taken on record levels of debt, much of it in the form of deductible
mortgage interest.244 Whatever its intent or efficacy, § 163(h) skewed

238. Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2246 (1986).
239. I.R.C. § 163(h). Under § 163(h)(2), this is defined as interest other than that paid or
accrued in a trade or business, investment interest, interest taken into account from a passive
activity, qualified residency interest, certain interest on payments of estate taxes during an extension
of time for payment and interest deductible under § 221 on an educational loan. Id.
240. Ward, supra note 9, at 887. See also GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986, Prepared by Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, 262-70 (1987).
241. See S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 804 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 1,804 which states:
Present law excludes or mismeasures income arising from the ownership of housing and
other consumer durables. Investment in such goods allows consumers to avoid the tax
that would apply if funds were invested in assets producing taxable income and to avoid
the cost of renting these items, a cost which would not be deductible in computing tax
liability. Thus, the tax system provides an incentive to invest in consumer durables
rather than assets which produce taxable income and, therefore, an incentive to consume
rather than save.
S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 804 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. 1, 804.
242. See Block, supranote 3, at 70.
243. It is difficult to imagine a Congress in which the Speaker of the House (Dennis Hastert)
and the former majority leader (Tom Delay) favor scrapping the IRS and the current income tax in
favor of a national sales tax, and would adopt such an overt attempt to control taxpayer behavior.
See Kemper, supra note 2, at IA.
244. Barbara Hagenbaugh, Consumer Debt Loads at Record, USA TODAY, March 18, 2004, at
lB. See also Kenneth Harney, Major Lenders See Future in Home-Equity Credit Card,BALT. SUN,
April 30, 2000, at IL.
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the tax neutrality of § 7872.
Before the adoption of § 163(h), § 7872 was largely tax-neutral,
i.e., its application to a transaction in many instances did not result in an
increase in income taxes to the parties. A taxpayer who received an item
that increased income in a below-market loan also had an offsetting
deduction. This was particularly, but not exclusively, true with respect
to compensation-related loans.
Under § 7872(a), a compensation-related demand loan entails a
transfer of the forgone interest from lender to borrower and a retransfer
from borrower to lender. Lender had a deductible compensation
expense and offsetting interest income in the same amount. That is still
true. The borrower had compensation income and an offsetting interest
deduction.245 This balancing was consistent with one of the schools of
thought as to how to treat the no-interest loan during Dean's heyday.2 46
Section 163(h) upset this balance. Unless the interest is deductible
under some exception to § 163(h), the borrower has no deduction to
offset the income he or she must report on the first transfer.247
The scheme of the transfer and retransfer of forgone interest was
foreshadowed in the scholarly literature before the adoption of § 7872.248
It appears to have been a means of achieving symmetry in the tax
consequences of the parties. If the interest the borrower "pays" on the
retransfer to the lender is not deductible, such symmetry no longer
exists. There is really no need for a retransfer at all. To be sure, the
lender who pays compensation gets a deduction. But there is no more
need to "even the score" with corresponding interest income than there
is when the employer pays and deducts compensation other than through
a below-market loan. In reality, the employer who resorts to a belowmarket loan is receiving nothing back as to the forgone interest. If the
borrower cannot deduct the "repayment," there is no longer any point in
245. With a compensation-related term loan, there was an asymmetry of timing between the
reporting of income and the corresponding deduction. Under § 7872(b)(1), the lender is deemed to
transfer the amount of forgone interest to the borrower on the date the loan is made. I.R.C. §
7872(b)(1). This is treated at that time as income to the borrower. Id. Under § 7872(b)(2), the
forgone interest is treated as original issue discount. Id. at § 7872(b)(2). Prior to the enactment of §
163(h), the borrower with respect to such an instrument received a deduction for interest that
corresponded with the daily reporting by the lender. See Id. at §§ 1272(a)(1), 163(e). Thus, the
timing of income and deduction did not match.
246. This was the approach of Judge Goldberg in his dissent in Martin v. Commissioner,649
F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (5th Cir. 1981) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
247. For example, if the indebtedness may be regarded as incurred in the taxpayer's trade or
business or if it is secured by the taxpayer's residence.
248. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Joyce & Louis A. Del Cotto, Interest-FreeLoans: The Odyssey of a
Misnomer, 35 TAX L. REV. 459, 461 (1980).
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making the lender pretend that any such repayment takes place.
The effect of § 163(h) is particularly harsh with respect to term
loans. Under the scheme of § 7872(b)(1), the borrower who receives
compensation must report the entire difference between the amount
loaned and the present value of all payments required to be made under
the loan in the year the loan is made. The effect of this provision is so
harsh as to serve as a deterrent to below-market term loans. 249 The
denial of any deduction at all only enhances the harshness of the
treatment of term loans.
The symmetry of the tax consequences of the parties under § 7872
may be seen most precisely with compensation-related loans since the
items are income for the recipient and a deduction for the payor.
With respect to corporation-shareholder loans, the transfer from the
corporate-lender to the shareholder-borrower may represent a dividend
to the shareholder. 250 The IRS has recognized that the transfer may be
2511
treated as a distribution of earnings and profits by the corporation.
These items, of course, do not offset each other,
but each party "gets
252
something" with respect to the forgone interest.

As with compensation-related loans, both parties reckon with tax
consequences on the transfer from lender to borrower. Since the
shareholder/borrower has no deduction most of the time there is no
reason to have taxpayers "square accounts" with a retransfer.
Eliminating that second step would mean that the corporation/lender
would not have to report the interest income. But again, Congress has
seen no need when a corporation pays a dividend through some means
other than a below-market loan to provide for some mechanism to offset
249. Consider the following example:
(i) On July 1, 1984, corporation Abe Co. makes a $200,000 interest-free three-year term
loan to shareholder Bob. The applicable Federal rate is 10-percent, compounded
semiannually.
(ii) The present value of this payment is $149,243.08, determined as follows:
$149,243.08
$200.000
[1 + (.10/2)]6

(iii) The excess of the amount loaned over the present value of all payments on the loan
($200,000 - $149,243.08), or $50,756.92, is treated as a distribution of property
(characterized according to section 301) paid to Bob on July 1, 1984. The same amount,
$50,756.92, is treated as original issue discount under IRC § 1272 and IRC § 163(e).
15A U.S. TAX RPTR., U.S.T.R.

78, 724.06 (2006).

250. A rule for distinguishing compensation from shareholder loans with respect to employers
who are significant shareholders is presented at Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(d)(2), 50 Fed. Reg.
33553, 33561 (Aug. 20, 1985).
251. See I.R.C. § 312(a). See also I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 95-45-007 (Aug. 10, 1995).

252. If there are no earnings and profits, there should be no income consequences to the
borrower, or at least no dividend income consequences. See I.R.C. § 316(a).
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the charge to earnings and profits.
With respect to gift loans, the symmetry of tax consequences of
lender and borrower endemic to § 7872 is again not as scrupulous as that
pertaining to compensation-related loans, but it is evident nonetheless.
The lender, of course, has no deduction when making a below-market
loan to the borrower; indeed he or she may incur a gift tax. Since the
transaction represents a gift for income tax purposes, the borrower has
no income tax consequences from the transfer.
Unlike the circumstances involving compensation-related or
corporation-shareholder loans, the lender enjoys no tax benefit on the
transfer. And up to a point, there is no offsetting retransfer. To the
extent loans between individuals do not exceed $100,000 and the
borrower does not have net investment interest, there is no retransfer.2 53
To the extent that the loan fails either condition, there is a retransfer
to from borrower to lender. In this instance, it cannot be contended that
§ 163(h) works any mischief in conjunction with the retransfer
provision. Indeed, it would not be appropriate to allow a deduction to
the borrower. The allowance of exclusion and deduction would be a
double benefit, generally abhorred by tax law.254 In this instance, the
retransfer provision works a mischief all its own. It compels the lender
to "enjoy" a return of capital he or she has foresworn and, when it is
applicable simply because the loans between the parties exceed
$100,000 and the borrower has no investment interest, a return that
simply does not exist. The anomalous consequences of this retransfer
are addressed in more detail below.
Section 163(h) had a significant effect on § 7872. It is quite likely
that this effect was not specifically intended by Congress. Such a
change to a complicated scheme should preferably be made with a clear
acknowledgment of its consequences.
B. Development of the Law Pertainingto Gift Loans Under§ 7872
The primary issue involving gift loans under § 7872 has involved
sales of property that may be regarded as part-sale, part-gift. 255 Assume,
for example, that a mother of an adult child owns a large tract of
unimproved land the value of which is likely to increase dramatically
between the present time and when it would be includable in her estate
253.
254.
255.
property

See I.R.C. § 7872 (d).
See Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970).
See Schneider, supra note 37, at 100 (discussing the relation between § 7872 and gifts of
given to children).
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at the time of her death. She therefore decides to "sell" the tract to her
son. Assume that the son pays $100,000 and gives a fifteen-year note
for $400,000 at six percent interest per annum, compounded semiannually. Total payments over that time will be $907,904.99.256
Assume, however, that the applicable federal rate is ten percent. The
present value of the payments under the contract, discounted at the
applicable federal rate, is $234,242.94. The difference between this
amount and the amount loaned, $400,000, is $165,757.06. Because the
present value of total payments under the loan, discounted at the
applicable federal rate, is less than the amount loaned, $400,000,
it is a
257
below-market loan under § 7872, at least according to the IRS.
According to the law of one circuit, however, there is no gift loan in
this situation. Since the loan bears interest at six percent and involves a
sale of property between relatives, the interest rate is sufficient for
purposes of § 483. That section generally requires treatment of a portion
of a payment under a contract for sale of property as interest to the
extent that unstated interest is allocable to such payment. 258 The
unstated interest is the excess of the sum of payments due under the
contract over the sum of the present values of such payments and any
interest payments under the contract. 259 The present value of the latter
payments is determined by using, as does § 7872, the applicable federal
rate under § 1274(d).
Pertinent to the circumstances of the taxpayer at hand, perhaps, is §
483(e), which provides for a maximum discount rate in determining
unstated interest of six percent in land sales between related parties 26° to
the extent that the sales price, when added to the aggregate sales price
for such prior sales between individuals during the calendar year, does
not exceed $500,000.261 This special rule under § 483(e) would provide
more favorable treatment to the mother than § 7872 in that as long as the
contract of sale with her son provides an interest rate of at least six
percent, 262 there may be no unstated interest and, hence, no taxable gift.
256. The source of these calculations is the compound interest calculator, available at
www.moneychimp.com (last visited May 11, 2006).
257. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,566 (Oct. 23, 1986).
258. Under § 483(a)(2), the allocations to the payments under the contract are made in a
manner consistent with § 1272(a), that is, the daily portions of the unstated interest, or original issue
discount, are allocated to each day the seller holds the buyer's debt instrument. I.R.C. § 483(a)(2).
259. Id. at § 483(b)(1), (2).
260. Id. at § 267(c)(4) (mother and son would qualify).
261.

Id. at § 483(e)(3) (assume our mother and son have no other such sales in the calendar

year).
262. If the applicable federal rate is less than six percent, the normal rule of subsection (b)
would apply and the contract rate would only have to at least equal that lower rate in order for the
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This special provision of § 483 was originally included as
subsection (g) in 1981 and provided for a maximum seven percent
interest rate. 263 Prior to that time, a six percent maximum rate for such
transactions was fixed by regulation. 264 It was designated as subsection
(e) with a maximum interest rate of six percent in 1985.265
This assumes, of course, that § 483, and more particularly § 483(e),
have anything to do with the calculation of a gift tax. As to that issue,
the signals are mixed. Section 7872 itself is superficially unambiguous:
it provides that it does not apply to loans to which § 483, 641(i), or §
1274 applies.266 The Service has promulgated regulations under § 483
that provide that it is inapplicable to certain obligations to which § 7872
applies. 267 This could apply to the above transaction involving mother
and son.
The IRS set out the rationale for its rejection of § 483(e) to the part
sale/part gift transactions involving a below-market interest rate in
General Counsel Memorandum (G.C.M.) 39,566.268 That document
dealt with a transfer by a taxpayer of a farm to her children in 1981 at a
time when the prevailing rate of interest was assumed to be fifteen
percent. The note was given by the children in the amount of $184x less
than the fair market value of the farm with a base interest rate of six

parties to avoid unstated interest. Id. at § 483.
263. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 126(a), 95 Stat. 172, 202 (1981).
264. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b)(1)(ii) (1966), superseded by T.D. 2517 1994-1 C.B. 38.
265. Pub. L. No. 99-121, § 102(c)(1), (3), 99 Stat. 505, 508.
266. I.R.C. § 7872(0(8). Both §§ 483 and 1274 employ the applicable federal rate in
recharacterizing principal as interest when debt instruments do not provide interest at the applicable
federal rate. See id. at §§ 1274(b), 483(b). Both apply to sales of non-publicly traded property. See
id. at. §§ 1274(c)(3)(D), 483(d)(1), which also provides that § 483 does not apply where § 1274
applies. For § 1274 to be applicable, there must be payments under a debt instrument more than six
months after the sale or exchange. See id. at § 1274(c)(1)(B). Under § 1274(c)(3)(C), the general
demarcation between the applicability of § 1274 and § 483 is whether a sale involves payments of
more than $250,000. Id. at § 1274(c)(3)(C). If payments do not involve more than $250,000,
generally § 483, unless otherwise excluded, is applicable. Id. Under § 1274(c)(3)(F), transactions
involving related parties within the ambit of § 483 rather than § 1274. Id. at § 1274(c)(3)(F). That
is significant when the applicable federal rate exceeds six percent because § 1274 employs the
applicable federal rate, while § 483(e)(1) employs a maximum rate of six percent. See id. at §§
1274(b)(2)(B), 483(e)(1).
267. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(c)(3)(ii) (1994), § 7872 applies for an obligee under a
contract for the sale or exchange of personal use property within the meaning of § 1274(b)(3), i.e.,
property not used in connection with a trade or business or activity for the production of income
under § 212, and that evidence a below-market loan described in § 7872(c)(1). Treas. Reg. § 1.483l(c)(3)(ii) (1994). Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(c)(3)(iii) provides that § 483 does not apply to any
payment under a contract that evidences a demand loan that is a below-market loan under §
7872(c)(1). Id. at § 1.483-1(c)(3)(iii).
268. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,566 (Oct. 23, 1986).
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percent.269 The document acknowledged that in a previous G.C.M., the
IRS had employed § 483 in valuing a note given in exchange for stock in
a transaction involving related parties.27 °
In G.C.M. 39,566, the Service saw the critical issue as whether §
483 applied to the entire Code or simply to income taxes, and concluded
that it applied only to income taxes. 2 71 The IRS based its conclusion on
what was largely a commonsense analysis that Congress intended § 483
to address a problem that did not involve the gift tax. Rather it was
aimed at transactions involving installment sales of capital assets in
which the parties opted not to provide for interest payments. This
allowed the seller to treat what should have represented interest
payments as capital gain and allowed the buyer to treat such payments as
72
2

basis.
According to the IRS, Congress saw this as manipulation of the tax
law.273 The IRS contended that such manipulation is not possible in the
gift tax context because "[w]hen the consideration in part gift, part sale
transactions is consistently valued
at fair market rates, there is no
274
opportunity for manipulation.,
It is certainly fair to say that Congress was not thinking in 1964
about avoidance of gift taxation on donative transactions involving
below-market "loans." At that time, the government had not even
signaled its disagreement with Dean. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the
Service plausibly applies to the part sale, part gift circumstances. Under
§ 7872 the existence of a taxable gift with respect to interest is
determined not by the fair market value of the asset, but by whether an
acceptable interest rate is charged on payments made at some time after
the sale or exchange of the asset. That is the same process employed
under § 483 to determine how much of payments represents interest and
how much represents capital gain.
The type of tax avoided by
unrealistic demarcations between principal and interest may differ, but
both demarcations are redrawn, in appropriate cases, by reference to a
realistic interest rate.
Of course, both §§ 483 and 7872, in referring generally to the
applicable federal rate, would offer no solace to our mother and son
269. Id.
270. In I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,331 (Jan. 23, 1985), the IRS stated that with respect to any
contract for the sale of property, but its terms, § 483 applies for all purposes of the Code. Id.
271. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,566 (Oct. 23, 1986).
272. Id. at ll-12.
273. Id. at 12. See also S. REP. No. 88-830, at 101-02 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 C.B. 505,

605-06.
274. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mer. 39,566 at 12.
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taxpayers. It is only § 483(e) that appears to apply to the transaction
between related parties. Neither § 483 generally nor § 7872 do so.
In light of the conflicting legislative and administrative signals
concerning the scope of § 483 and its relationship to § 7872, it is not
surprising that court decisions addressing this matter do not reach a
single result, although those of the Tax Court do. There are three cases
that consider the applicability of § 483(e) to circumstances like our part
sale, part gift transaction. The first two 275 involved transactions that
occurred in 1981, a time of remarkably high interest rates,2 76 before the
effective date of § 7872.277 Thus, the IRS urged the applicability of a
market approach for the interest rate used to discount the sellers'
obligations similar to what the Tax Court approved in Blackburn v.
Commissioner.278 In one of the cases, § 7872 was available and the
Service successfilly argued its applicability.27 9
In Ballard v. Commissioner, the taxpayer sold real estate to her
three children that she contended (and the IRS ultimately agreed) was
worth $572,000.280 The buyers gave taxpayer a note, payable over fortyfive years in the amount of $386,000.281 It bore interest at six percent
per annum. Using an eighteen percent interest rate, the IRS discounted it
to $134,290.26 thus substantially increasing the amount of the taxable
gift for the taxpayer.
The taxpayer argued that as long as she charged six percent interest
on the money her children borrowed from her, she had made no gift.
Although the court agreed with the taxpayer that the language in the first
sentence of § 483(a), which stated that it applied "for purposes of this
title," connoted that its applicability was not limited to income taxes, it
could not agree that phrase was applicable to valuation for gift tax
purposes.282

The court viewed the value of property as "the price at which such
property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing

275. See Krabbenhoft v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 887 (1990), affd, 939 F.2d 529 (8th Cir.
1991); Ballard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1987), rev'd,854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1988).
276. Hobart Rowan, The Interest Rate Roller Coaster, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1981, at A27.
277. Section 7872 became effective June 6, 1984. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-1(b), 50 Fed.
Reg. 33553, 33556 (Aug. 20, 1985).
278. Blackburn, 20 T.C. 204. See supra notes 181-186 and accompanying text for discussion.
279. Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992).
280. Ballard v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 323 (1987), rev'd, 854 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1988).
281. At which time the seller would have been 113 years old! Ballard, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) at
324.
282. Id. at 326.
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seller., 283 The court found § 483 as not concerned with that, but rather,
with recharacterizing portions of payments, "when284not enough interest
has been provided for in [an] installment contract.'
In stating that § 483 was not concerned about the present value of
payments under the contract but rather about characterization of capital
gain as ordinary income, the court overlooked that both inquiries really
entail determining the same number in the same way. The different
names given to the calculations did not logically compel selecting one
notion or the other of what interest rate to use in establishing how much
of the payments must be regarded as interest. The court assumed that
Congress would not have changed the285 "basic valuation principle
followed in Blackburn" without saying so.
Remarkably, the taxpayer relied on § 7872 as an example of
Congress' providing that no gift will be found as long as a specified rate
is charged.286 The court simply deflected the taxpayer's argument
related to § 7872 on the basis of its inapplicability to the transaction
because of its effective date.287 The court did determine that interest
rates on mortgages in the taxpayer's locale were a more appropriate
guide for determining the interest rate and thus discounted the buyers'
obligation at sixteen percent rather than the government's eighteen
percent.288
The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court.289 It regarded the
language in § 483(a) applying "for purposes of this title" as
unambiguously applying to gift as well as income taxes. 290 The court
could not see any indication in the legislative history that the section did
not apply to gift taxes. 291 The court ridiculed the Commissioner's
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.at 326. But Congress literally did so. For Justice Scalia, that of course, would be
sufficient:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of
which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1)most in accord
with the context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the
whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute....
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
286. Surely the taxpayer would not have referred favorably to § 7872 had it actually been
applicable, for § 7872's use of the applicable federal rate would have yielded a result much like
what the government urged in Ballard. See I.R.C. § 7872.
287. Ballard,53 T.C.M. (CCH) at 327.
288. Id. at 328.
289. Ballard,854 F.2d 185.
290. Id. at 188.
291. Id.
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construction of § 483 as akin to Humpty Dumpty's insistence that a
word means "what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less. 292 The
court viewed § 483 as a safe harbor even for purposes of gift tax
valuation.
The Tax Court next considered the question of the proper rate to
discount a buyer's obligation in a part sale, part gift transaction in
Krabbenhofi v. Commissioner.293 In that case, the taxpayers sold farm
land worth $404,000 to their sons under a contract providing for thirty
annual payments of $29,060 at six percent interest.2 94
The
Commissioner discounted the buyers' obligation using an interest rate of
eleven percent, determining a present value of $252,642.295 It treated the
difference between the value of the land and the present value of the
contract as a gift.
Because its decision in Krabbenhoft was appealable to a different
circuit than that in Ballard,the Tax Court was not bound by the Seventh
296
Circuit's decision in Ballard.
The court essentially reiterated its
conclusion in Ballardthat while § 483 applied to all sections of the Code
to which it was relevant, it had nothing to do with valuation for purposes
297
of the gift tax.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, disagreeing with the
2 98
Seventh Circuit in Ballard.
It agreed with the Tax Court that § 483
had nothing to do with valuation for gift tax purposes. It opined that the
decision of the Seventh Circuit was based on government counsel's
"fairy tale logic," i.e., the "specious[ ]" argument that the taxpayer
would have suffered imputation of only a seven percent interest rate if
she had charged less than six percent.299 Since the government had
repudiated that contention and the court no longer confronted "fairy tale
logic," it determined that the IRS was unshackled by the maximum six
percent interest rate in discounting the buyers' purchase obligation under
292.

Id. at 189 (quoting LEWIS CARROL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND).

In particular, the court

ridiculed the IRS contention of the statute that if the taxpayer had failed to provide the minimumsix
percent rate in statute, an interest rate of seven percent would have been imputed. Id. It quoted the
attorney for the Commissioner as contending that a rate of eighteen percent could be imputed when
the taxpayer complied with the statutory minimum of six percent "because § 483 does not mean
what it says." Id.
293. Krabbenhoft, 94 T.C. 887.
294. Id. at 888.
295. Id.
296. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
297. Krabbenhoft,94 T.C. at 890.
298. Krabbenhoft,939 F.2d 529.
299. Id. at 532-33.
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300

the contract.
In the final case involving valuation of a purchase obligation,
Frazee v. Commissioner, the transaction at issue occurred after the
effective date of § 7872.30 1 The Tax Court applied the same reasoning
as it had in the two earlier decisions and held against the taxpayer.
In Frazee the taxpayers transferred 12.2 acres of improved real
estate to their four children. 30 2 In exchange, taxpayers received a
promissory note with a principal amount of $380,000 bearing interest at
seven percent. 30 3 The note called for a twenty-year graduated repayment
schedule of quarterly payments. A good part of the court's opinion
involved the question of the value of the real property transferred. The
court ultimately determined that the value was $1,000,000, $950,000 to
the land and $50,000 to the improvements.30 4
In order to value the gift, the court had to value the consideration
given by the children: the $380,000 note.30 5 The issue was whether there
was a gift in addition to that representing the difference between
$1,000,000 and $380,000, the amount of the note that bore a belowmarket interest rate. 306
The court noted that this was its first opportunity to consider the
In resolving this issue, the court
scope of § 7872 in light of § 483.
noted the conflicting IRS positions. The first was in gift tax regulations
3 8
proposed for § 2512, and complementing income tax provisions, 0
which would treat § 483 as controlling with respect to valuing a belowmarket debt instrument. 30 9 The court noted that the Commissioner took
the opposite position in G.C.M. 39,566. 3 " Although that did not
specifically involve § 7872 because the transaction therein preceded its
effective date, it indicated that § 7872 would apply to the part sale/part

300. Id. at 533-34.
301. Frazee,98 T.C. 554.
302. Id. at 555.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 560.
305. Frazee, 98 T.C. at 561-62. Under § 2512(b), the amount by which the value of the
property exceeds that of the consideration exchanged is the amount of the gift. I.R.C. § 2514(b).
306. Frazee,98 T.C. at 579-80.
307. Id. at 580.
308. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8, 51 Fed. Reg. 12022, 12096 (April 8, 1986).
309. Rather than employing the proposed regulations as a matter of estoppel against the
government, the court treated them as a "body of informed judgment as to which courts may draw
on for guidance." Frazee, 98 T.C. at 582 (quoting Bolton v. Commissioner, 694 F.2d 556, 561 n.10
(9th Cir. 1982)).
310. Frazee, 98 T.C. at 582. See also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Memo. 39,566 (Oct. 23, 1986).
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gift transaction after its effective date. 311 The court stated that it would
decide the issue on the basis of the Code sections, the legislative history
and the case law.31 2
Looking at the appellate holding in Ballard, which had treated §
483 as applicable, the court opined that it would create an "anomalous
result[]" to instances in which the transferor dies before the note is
paid.3 13 The court stated that in such a situation the note would be
valued at its then remaining face value rather than its discounted present
value.31 4 The court 3stated
that this creates an estate tax on wealth that
15
does not really exist.

Such a phenomenon is really more of a tradeoff than an anomaly, at
least when the applicable federal rate is greater than six percent, and
then only if the loan is not paid off. In resorting to the part sale/part gift
perhaps years before the asset sold would have to be included in the
testamentary estate, the seller has an opportunity to reduce the wealth
subject to the tax.
The court also viewed the use under § 483(e) of a single rate of six
percent as facilitative of land sales in times of high interest. 316 The court
identified no Congressional consideration of such a purpose with respect
to gift taxes. Nevertheless, the imposition of stiff gift tax liability under
the circumstances of Ballard, Krabbenhoft, and Frazee amounts to a
taking away with one hand whatever facilitation Congress intended to
provide to intrafamily sales with the other.
Since Frazee there has been silence with respect to the issue of
whether § 483 or § 7872 controls in discounting the buyer's obligation
in a part sale/part gift among related parties. In light of the interest rates
that have prevailed in the years since the last word of the Tax Court in
1992, that is not surprising.317 Until interest rates rise above six percent,

311.

See supra note 278.

312. Frazee, 98 T.C. at 583.
313. Id. at 584.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 585.
317. A look at the trend of the long-term applicable federal rate, compounded semi-annually,
which would be applicable to these long-term part sale/part gift transactions shows a steady decline
in the rate to less than the six percent rate of § 483(e) for much of the time:
YearSourceRate[:]
1990Rev. Rul. 90-52, 1990-2 C.B. 192-8.55%
1992Rev. Rul. 92-50, 1992-2 C.B. 205-7.59%
1994Rev. Rul. 94-44, 1994-2 C.B. 190-7.33%
1996Rev. Rul. 96-34, 1996-2 C.B. 75-7.00%
1998Rev. Rul. 98-33, 1998-2 C.B. 25-5.80%
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§ 7872 is most likely to be a sleeping beast, at least with respect to loans
among related parties in which some interest is charged. Even if interest
rates were to rise to the point that the applicable federal rate exceeded
the six percent "safe harbor" of § 483(e), the $1,000,000 unified credit
applicable to gifts since 2002,318 would reduce the likelihood of disputes
over taxable gifts between taxpayers and the government. Thus, the
twists and turns of tax law in this area may, like so much else in the
economy, be as dependent on things such as the floating of the Chinese
yuan, vel non, as it is on the behavior of the taxpayer and the tax
collector.319
Although there have been no recent reported cases involving gift
taxable part sale/part gifts, the IRS has invoked Frazee in a private
ruling involving a stock redemption that has the effect of transferring
corporate control between related individuals. In Private Ruling 9408018
all of the stock in Company was held by A and B, A's son. 3 20 A held
ninety-two percent of the stock, B the rest. A decided to terminate his
interest in Company.
Company exchanged notes in redemption of A's stock. One note
required monthly payments of principal and interest over twenty years.
The other required monthly payments of interest and a single balloon
payment on the first day of the one-hundred-forty-fiftth month after the
redemption. The Service assumed that the notes bore at least the
applicable federal rate.
The Service "held," among other things, that B, who through the
transaction obtained A's interest in the corporation, did not have a
constructive dividend.321 It also noted that provision of the applicable
federal rate precluded imposition of the gift tax. The Service also
discussed Frazee on the question of whether the fair market value of a
promissory note issued by children to their parents in exchange for real
property must be determined by a discount rate under § 7872 or the safe
harbor rate of § 483(e).
Although the Service does not say so explicitly, the reference to
Frazee indicates that the scrutiny of the transaction for the sufficiency of
the interest rate on the obligation of the corporation concerns whether
2000Rev. Rul. 2000-32, 2000-2 C.B. 1-6.30%
2002Rev. Rul. 2002-40, 2002-2 C.B. 30-5.61%
2004Rev. Rul. 2004-66, 2004-27 1.R.B. 4-5.27%
2005Rev. Rul. 2005-38, 2005-27 I.R.B. 6-4.30%
318. See I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1).
319. See, e.g., How High Will China's Yuan Fly?, WASH. POST, Jul. 24, 2005, at F2.
320. I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 94-08-018 (Nov. 29, 1993).
321. Id. at 32 (citing Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 C.B. 920).
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there is a gift loan to B, the son. The Service noted that the Gift Tax
Regulations provide that the gift tax applies to gifts made indirectly, to
any transaction in which property is passed gratuitously or conferred
upon another, regardless of the means or device employed.322 It appears
from the analysis of the Service that while A's interest is passed
gratuitously to the son, as long as the interest rate on the obligation is at
least the applicable federal rate, there is no taxable gift. The ruling
demonstrates the ability of the Service to look beyond the transaction as
structured by the parties to find a loan taxable under § 7872.
1. Beware the "Unintended" Gift Loan!
One of the most significant decisions involving taxable gift loans
under § 7872 (other than those involving the part sale/part gift issue) is
True v. Commissioner.323 The better part of the lengthy Tax Court and
Tenth Circuit opinions were devoted to valuing estate assets that were
subject to buy-sell agreements. For present purposes the most significant
aspect of the case involves the application of § 7872 to what was quite
likely not intended to be a gift. The predicament in which the taxpayer
found herself serves as a powerful warning to move along in a
businesslike way the transfers of assets even among relatives especially among relatives!
In True, the taxpayer was a widow whose husband had established
large family-owned oil and cattle ranching businesses. Before his death,
the paterfamilias transferred most of his interests in the business to a
trustee and the rest to a qualified terminable interest trust (QTIP) 3 24 for

the taxpayer.
After her husband's death, the taxpayer no longer wished to be
involved in the family businesses. She sold her interests to her sons
pursuant to buy-sell agreements her husband had devised to keep the

322. I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 94-08-018 (Nov. 29, 1993) (citing Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(1)
(1997)). The proposed regulations under § 7872 suggest two ways for accomplishing what the
ruling implies would happen if the obligation to the seller were below-market, i.e., a taxable gift
from mother to son. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-4(g)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33561 (Aug. 20,
1985) would provide for below-market loans from the mother to the corporation and then from the
corporation to the son.
Subsection (g)(2) of the same proposed regulations addresses circumstances when use of a
intermediary is intended to avoid application of § 7872. Id. at § 1.7872-4(g)(2). That would not be
the case here, since use of a corporation in which both mother and son are shareholders would
invoke § 7872. Where it is applicable, however, this subsection simply permits ignoring the
intermediary and treating the loan as between parties that would cause applicability of § 7872.
323. 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27 (2001), affid, 390 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2004).
324. True, 82 T.C.M. at 45. See also I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).
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businesses in the family.
The taxpayer gave notice to her sons that she desired to sell her
interests on June 30 and July 1, 1994. This notice triggered her
obligation to sell these interests but the agreements provided that sales
did not have to be consummated until six months after those dates. She
was not paid until three months after those dates.325
The price she received for her interests from her sons was
$13,298,978. The agreement did not provide for any interest to be paid
representing the time between the taxpayer's notice date and the date she
was paid for her interests. The IRS contended that under the buy-sell
agreement, the sale was consummated on the notice date and that in
receiving payment three months later she had made a gift loan of the
interest on the purchase price in the amount of $192,307.
The taxpayer made three arguments against the IRS's assertion of a
gift. First, she argued that the sale was completed on the payment date
and that there was, therefore, no loan at all. The court looked to the
agreement itself, Wyoming law, and federal law to conclude
otherwise.32 6
Secondly, the taxpayer contended that either § 483 or § 1274
prevented the application of § 7872. The taxpayer relied on § 483 on the
basis that no payment could be made more than one year after the
contract, 327 and on § 1274 because none of the payments were due more
than six months after the contract.328 Thus, since neither section
permitted recharacterization of the principal amount of the purchase
price as interest, she had made no gift of interest.
The court turned to Frazee in rejecting taxpayer's attempt to avoid
§ 7872 by resort to § 483 or § 1274. It again concluded that those
sections pertained only to characterization of installment payments for
income tax purposes.3 29
The court also relied on Frazee for the proposition that § 7872 does
not apply solely to loans of money but also to seller-provided financing
for the sale of property. 330 The court then concocted a term loan from
325. True, 82 T.C.M. at 120.
326. Id. at 122.
327. See I.R.C. § 483(c)(1).
328. Id. at § 1274(c)(1).
329. True, 82 T.C.M. at 124. The court acknowledged that proposed regulations under § 7872,
specifically Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2, 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33557 (1985), provide that § 7872 is
inapplicable to any loan given in consideration for the sale or exchange of property within the
meaning of § 483(c)(1) or § 1274(c)(1) even if those sections are inapplicable. Id. The court
regarded proposed regulations as to be accorded no more weight than a "litigating position." Id.
330. Id. at 125.
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the dealings of the taxpayer and her sons. Since the agreement required
the sale to be consummated within six months of the notice dates, rather
than on demand of the taxpayer, it was not a demand loan and, hence,
was a term loan.33 ' Since the parties did not provide for any interest
(which is not an unreasonable course as they probably did not imagine
they were making a loan when the buyers did not promptly remit the
purchase price to their mother on the notice dates) the difference
between the amount "loaned" and its present value discounted at the
applicable federal rate was deemed to be loaned on the notice dates.
The court also rejected the taxpayer's contention that § 7872 was
inapplicable because the transaction was in the ordinary course of
business and thus not a gift. 332 The court subjects intrafamily
transactions claimed to be in the ordinary course to special scrutiny. 333 It
noted that it had held in another part of the opinion that the inadequate
price the taxpayer had received under the buy-sell agreement for her
interests in the businesses had given rise to taxable gifts.
In using the simple fact of a gift in the exchange of property itself,
which entails no requirement of a donative intent, 334 but rather, a
disparity between the values of the consideration exchanged, the court
reaches too far. The court adverted to no indication of donative intent
with respect to the execution of payment by the buyers. Payment simply
did not occur at the first legal moment it could have. If the Tax Court is
willing to uphold such a far-fetched imposition of a gift tax on what was
most likely a simple failure to consummate the transaction as promptly
as possible, taxpayers involved in intra-family transactions should be
attentive. Every day one delays may be a gift - to the government!
2. The Anomalous Retransfer for Gift Loans
As with all of the other types of below-market loans to which §
7872 applies, § 7872 contemplates that the forgone interest transferred
by the lender to the borrower may be retransferred from borrower to
lender. The difference between gift loans and other below-market loans
in this respect is that there is a floor at which it begins. Unless the
outstanding loans between lender and borrower exceed $100,000, or the
borrower has net investment income, there is no retransfer.335 Thus,
331.

Id. See also I.R.C. § 7872(f)(6).

332. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1992).
333. True, 82 T.C.M. at 125 (citing Harwood v. Commissioner. 82 T.C. 239 (1984), afid. 786
F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986) (without opinion)).
334. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Schultz, 376 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1974).
335. I.R.C. § 7872(d)(1)(D). Net investment income has the same meaning as in § 163(d)(4).
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there is no retransfer when the loans between borrower and lender do not
exceed $100,000 and the borrower does not have more than $1,000 in
net investment income; and all forgone interest transfers to the lender
when a loan exceeds $100,000 without regard to the borrower's net
investment income. Making retransfer dependent on the borrower's net
investment income serves as a useful weapon against tax avoidance. To
the extent that the retransfer operates without respect to the borrower's
productive use of the loaned funds, as it does when the loans among the
parties exceed $100,000, it taxes the phantom of the lender's opportunity
cost and brings needless complexity to the tax law.
With respect to a gift loan, unlike other loans to which § 7872
applies, the retransfer is the only aspect of the loan transaction that has
income tax implications. The transfer, as a gift, may have gift tax
implications for the lender. As a gift, the transfer does not represent
income to the borrower.336 To the extent the borrower enjoys income
from the loaned proceeds there is an opportunity for abuse. If the
borrower is in a lower income tax bracket than the lender, below-market
loans would present an opportunity to get around the restrictions on
shifting income intended for the grantor trust provisions of the Code.3 37
This is responsive to a significant tax avoidance problem during Dean's
heyday.3 38 To the extent that there is a retransfer under any other
circumstances, no valid tax policy is served.
The transfer and retransfer entailed in § 7872(a) and (b) was
foreshadowed in some of the scholarship that preceded the enactment of
§ 7872. 339 Professor Halperin described the transfer/retransfer scheme
as a disaggregation and contended that it implements the "'HaigSimons' ideal of current taxation of investment income to the party who
receives the income in one form or another., 340 To the extent that there
is income to be taxed, indeed it does.
But the essence of the Haig-Simons principle of income taxation is
that there be a gain in the accounting period. 34 1 Retransferring the
Id. at § 7872(d)(1)(E)(i). The first $1,000 of net investment income is disregarded in determining
whether there is a retransfer.
336. See I.R.C. § 102.

337. See id. at §§ 671-677.
338.

Seesupra notes 181-190.

339. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 248, at 504-05 (as to some transactions). See also
Robert I. Keller, The Tax Consequences of Interest-FreeLoans from Corporationsto Shareholders
andfrom Employers to Employees, 19 B.C. L. REV. 231, 275 (1978).
340. See Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "'TimeValue of Money, " 95 YALE
L.J. 506, 515 (1986).
341. See ROBERT MURRAY HAIG, THE CONCEPT OF INCOME (1920), reprintedin THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX 1, 27 (Robert Murray Haig ed., Columbia University Press 1921) (stating that "[t]he
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forgone interest as to loans between lender and borrower in instances in
which the borrower has not put the borrowed funds to good use, or
cannot be deemed to have done so, imposes an income tax when there
has been no economic gain.
In a sense, retransferring income to the lender, who may already
have incurred liability for gift tax on the transfer, taxes the opportunity
cost of the lender in making the below-market loan. The courts in
Crown v. Commissioner,342 and particularly the district court in Johnson
v. United States343 sensibly saw this as reaching the arm of the tax
collector too far.
This retransfer would seem to frustrate the exclusion from gift tax
in § 2503(e) for qualified transfers for tuition or medical care for a
borrower-donee. 344 While a transfer of interest with respect to a belowmarket loan for these purposes would not be subject to gift tax, no
provision prevents a retransfer of forgone interest to the lender when gift
loans for these purposes exceed $100,000 to a borrower.34 5
To the extent that the borrower has net investment income, it should
be taxed to the lender.346 The transaction is not serving the purpose
intended by the gift tax exclusion. On the other hand, if the borrower
does not have such income, there is no tax avoidance entailed in the
lender's assistance to the borrower with such expenses. It is ridiculous
to impose a tax on such generosity. The same is true if the lender makes
a below-market loan to assist the borrower with the purchase of a home.
There is no gift tax exclusion with respect to a gift of the transferred
interest to the borrower, but there is no justification in imposing an
income tax on the lender through a retransfer. That would amount to a
tax on the imputed rental value of the borrower's home imposed on the
lender. Congress in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 rejected such taxation
of the homeowner 347 and should do so with respect to gift loans used for
this purpose.
As the years since the enactment of § 7872 have passed, Congress
formal definition of economic income, which, in the opinion of the writer, provides the most
acceptable concept of income, may be stated as follows: Income is the money-value of the net
accretion to economic power between two points of time") (emphasis in original). See also HENRY
C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 51 (1938) (stating that "[t]he essential connotation of

income... is gain-gain to someone during a specified period and measured according to objective
market standards").
342. Crown, 67 T.C. 1060. See supra notes 188-199 for discussion.
343. Johnson, 254 F. Supp. 73.
344. See I.R.C. § 2503 (e).
345. See id at § 7872 (d)(l)(D).
346. See id.
at § 7872 (d)(l)(E).
347. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-426, at 297 (1986).
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has provided that taxpayers may take penalty-free distributions for this
purpose from certain individual retirement accounts.34 8 It would be
sensible to eliminate the tax burden on the use of below-market loans to
allow a borrower to obtain an education, medical care or to purchase a
home, even when the amount loaned exceeds $100,000, as long as the
borrower does not have net investment income.
The retransfer
provisions of § 7872 should be modified to provide for retransfer of
forgone interest to the lender only when the borrower has such income.
C. Compensation Loans
The most significant development with respect to compensation
loans is the promulgation of regulations concerning split-dollar
insurance loans. 349 These lengthy regulations are the only permanent
regulations promulgated under § 7872 so far. They dovetail with
regulations under § 61 that address circumstances in which split-dollar
life insurance is provided as compensation and not in the form of a
loan. 350 A split-dollar life insurance arrangement is defined as:
[A]ny arrangement between an owner and a non-owner of a life
insurance contract that satisfies the following criteria:
(i) Either party to the arrangement pays, directly or indirectly, all or
any portion of the premiums on the life insurance contract, including a
payment by means of a loan to the other party that is secured by the
life insurance contract;
(ii) At least one of the parties to the arrangement paying the
premiums... is entitled to recover (either conditionally or
unconditionally) all or any portion of those premiums and such
recovery is to be made from, or is secured by, the proceeds of the life
insurance contract; and
(iii) The arrangement is not part of a group-term life insurance plan
described in section 79 unless the group-term life insurance plan
provides permanent benefits to employees .... 351

348. See I.R.C. §§ 72(t)(8), 408A(d)(5).
349. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15 (2003).
350. See id. at § 1.61-22(b)(3) (which provides generally that the rules for taxing to employees
the economic benefit of employer-provided life insurance (not excludable under I.R.C. § 79)
contained in these regulations do not apply to split-dollar loans within the meaning of Treas. Reg. §
1.7872-15).
351. Id. at § 1.61-22(b)(1).
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If a split-dollar arrangement does not involve a split-dollar loan
within the scope of the regulations under § 7872 or is not made in
consideration for economic benefits under the regulations under § 61,
then it is treated under general income, employment, self-employment
and gift tax principles. 352 An extensive commentary on split-dollar
insurance arrangements has stated that with the promulgation of
regulations under §§ 61 and 7872 in 2003 "the taxpayer
friendly split353
dollar arrangements we have known ceased to exist.

The statement in the regulations under § 61 that benefits of splitdollar arrangements might be taxed to beneficiaries under general
principles of taxation belies the necessity for the extensive new
regulations under § 61.354 Nevertheless, with respect to loan-financed
split-dollar arrangements, taxation of the forgone interest of a loan used
to finance such an arrangement is a departure from the past. Once upon
a time the IRS ruled that payment by an employer of annual premiums
on life insurance of an employee to the extent of the increases in the cash
surrender value of the policy with the employer to be repaid at the death
of the employee did not create income to the employee.355 This was
based on the notion that, "[t]he mere making
available of money does
356
not result in realized income to the payee.

This, of course, was in the midst of that long period before Dean
during which the government did not treat interest-free loans as creating
income for borrowers. Now "[i]f a split-dollar loan is a below-market
loan, then... the loan is governed by section 7872." ' Consequences to
lender and borrower depend on the relationship of the parties and
whether it is a demand or a term loan. 358 Some of the cumbersome
aspects of § 7872 are manifest in the application of the regulations with
respect to split-dollar insurance arrangements.
First, the transfer and retransfer scheme of § 7872(a) and (b) applies
to split-dollar loans.3 59
The retransfer serves no useful purpose
regardless of the relationship between lender and borrower. If it is a gift
loan, the lender may have incurred gift tax liability and the borrower has
a non-taxable gift. The borrower is not generally able to deduct interest
352. Id. at § 1.61-22(b)(5).
353. See Donald 0. Jansen, Split DollarHas Split - So How Do We FinancePremiums Now?,
38 ANN. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN.

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

1300 (2004).

Treas. Reg. § 1.61-22(b)(5) (2003).
See Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 C.B. 23.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15(a)(1) (2003).
Id.
Id. at § 1.7872-15(e)(3)(iii), (4)(iv), (v).
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"paid" on any retransfer to the lender.36 ° If the loans between the parties
exceed $100,000 there is a retransfer to the lender but, as contended
36
previously, this is simply a tax on an opportunity cost of the lender. 1
This is consonant with the fiction of the implied loan that § 7872 entails,
but in fact, the lender has foreswom the making of such a commercially
realistic loan. Treating the lender as transferring the forgone interest to
the borrower carries the fiction far enough.
If, as is most likely the case, it is a compensation-related loan there
is again no need for a retransfer from employee or independent
contractor to the lender. The lender has a deductible expense in the
amount of the forgone interest and the borrower has taxable
compensation. The borrower generally has no deduction on a retransfer
to the lender, as might have been the case before the enactment of §
163(h) in 1986. There is no need to cancel out the lender's deduction for
compensation expense simply because the lender will someday have a
return of the principal. Until that time the lender does not have use of
the principal, the amount of interest used to pay compensation has been
foresworn, the same as if it had been paid without resort to a belowmarket loan. Only the first transfer of interest by lender to borrower is
necessary to reflect the tax effects of the transaction. The retransfers
entail needless complexity and, under the tax treatment of indirect loans
362
under the new regulations, may generate a surreal number of transfers.
While, as noted previously, a retransfer serves a useful purpose when the
borrower with respect to a gift loan has net investment income, it serves
no such purpose with respect to a compensation loan.363
A second unnecessary aspect of § 7872 is that in defining
compensation-related loans, § 7872 specifies loans between "an
employer and an employee. 364 This means that § 7872 might apply to a
loan made by an employee to his or her employer. While this might
serve some notion of legislative symmetry, it is completely unnecessary.
Before the enactment of § 7872 there was a significant amount of tax

360. id. at § 1.7872-15(c).
361. See supra IV.B.2.
362. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-15(e)(2) (2003) (See particularly example 1, in which Employer
X makes a premium payment by loan to A, who isthe child of X's employee, B. That loan is
restructured as two loans, a compensation loan between X and B and a gift loan between B and A.
Such loans would entail transfers and retransfers with respect to each loan. Such circuity seems
unnecessary when the value of the insurance coverage itself could be taxed to B without resort to §
7872. See Treas. Reg. 1-61.2(d)(2)(ii) (2003)).
363. See supra notes 308-311 and accompanying text (offering a discussion of gift loans in the
context of a borrower's net investment income).
364. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(B)(i).
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avoidance through use of loans by employers to employees. 365 There is
no indication that there was any sort of avoidance involving loans
running the other way. It is difficult to imagine what such abuse might
entail other than circumstances in which an employee wishes or needs to
make a loan to preserve his or her employment by creating or financing
In such instance, there sometimes is a question,
the employer.
particularly when the employer is unable to repay the "debt," whether
the employee's advance was a loan or a capital contribution. This is
important as to whether the creditor-employee may take a bad debt
In such instance, it is important to
deduction under § 166.366
characterize the advance properly. That interest is served by existing
regulations and case law.367 There is no legitimate interest in requiring
an employee who is somehow motivated to lend to his or her employer
to do so at arm's length, as § 7872 does when it is applicable. Applying
§ 7872 invokes the retransfer which can result in the employer receiving
income.
The Tax Court criticized in dictum the application of § 7872 to
loans by employees. In Albertson 's, Inc. v. Commissioner, an employer
sought to deduct interest on a portion of amounts set aside as deferred
compensation. 368 The taxpayer sought to deduct amounts of the deferred
compensation treated as interest in the year accrued rather than in the
year paid. 369 The government successfully contended that the "interest"
was deferred compensation, deductible only under § 404(a)(5) or (d).
The court held that there was no forbearance of money of which
payment was due because the employees had no right to demand
payment in the year at issue.

371

In a footnote, the court stated that if it characterized such a
transaction as a loan in instances which it did not include an interest
factor, it would have to treat it as an interest-free loan under § 7872.372
That would require the employees to report an amount of imputed
interest income even in years such employees did not have a right to
receive the principal amount. The court stated that Congress did not

365. See Closius & Chapman, supra note 89.
366. See, e.g., Litwin v. United States, 983 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1993).
See also, e.g., Roth Steel Tube Co.
367. See Treas. Reg. § 1.166-1(c) (1959).
Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987).

v.

368. Albertson's, Inc. v. Commissioner,95 T.C. 415 (1990).
369. Id. at 418-19.
370. Id. at 430.
371.

Id. at 422-23.

372. Id. at 423 n.6.
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desire such a result in enacting § 7872. 373
Such a construction is not far-fetched, however, at least as § 7872 is
now drafted. That an employee might not be permitted to withdraw the
funds in the deferred compensation account would mean only that it is
not a demand loan. As such, it would be a term loan.374 To eliminate
this potential anomaly, § 7872(c)(1)(B)(i) should be amended to provide
that compensation-related loans are loans only by an employer to an
employee.
Finally, when the split-dollar loan, or any compensation loan, is a
term loan, the taxation of the amount of the original issue discount, that
is, the difference between the amount loaned and the present value of
payments required to be made under the terms of375
the loan, must be
reported by the borrower on the day the loan is made.
The harshness of the application of this tax treatment appears in an
example in the new regulations under § 7872.376 In this example,
Employer T, pursuant to a split-dollar arrangement, makes a $100,000
payment for a policy on the life of Employee G.377 The loan is for a
term of three years. The repayment provided is the principal plus an
amount based on the increase in price of a specified commodity. The
example assumes this latter amount to be 0. It further determined the
present value of the payment due three years hence was $76,289.52.378
Thus, the difference between that amount and the amount loaned, or
$23,710.48, was deemed to be transferred to the taxpayer on the day the
employer paid the premium.379
It is a grotesque distortion of income to tax the entire amount of
forgone interest attributable to the term of the loan on the day of the
transfer. The borrower's income, which is easily calculable and
allocable to the term of the loan, is allocated to one day of one taxable
year. The longer the term, the more grotesquely unrealistic is this
imposition of taxation. Since the transaction in this case does not
373. Id. To some extent the proposed regulations support the idea that Congress could not
have intended that employee to employer loans may be within the ambit of § 7872. Prop. Reg. §
1.7872-4(c)(1) provides that a compensation loan is "a below-market loan that is made in
connection with the performance of services." Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-4(c)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553,
33567 (Aug. 20, 1985). It would be absurd to contend that an amount advanced by an employee to
his or her employer would be compensatory unless there existed between them an independent
employment relationship working the other way.
374.
375.

I.R.C. § 7872(f)(6).
See I.R.C. § 7872(b)(1).

376. See Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-150j)(5), Example 1 (2003).
377. Id. at § 1.7872-15()(5), Example (1)(i).
378.

Id. at § 1.7872-15()(5), Example (l)(iii).

379. Id. at § 1.7872-15(j)(5), Example (1)(iv).
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directly provide the borrower with cash to pay the taxes on the income,
the tax treatment itself is a strong disincentive to resort to a belowmarket loan. The borrower with respect to a term loan should be
permitted to report the transferred amount ratably over the term of the
loan. Although the reporting of original issue discount income by the
lender on the retransfer is not logically analogous to the position of the
borrower with respect to a term loan,380 there is no reason that enjoyment
of the value of money should not be allocated over the time of such
enjoyment whether taxpayer is a lender or a below-market debtor.
D. Corporation-ShareholderLoans
Loans between corporations and shareholders have generated about
half of the case law involving § 7872. As with the other forms of belowmarket loans, cases have shown areas in which § 7872 might
appropriately be amended to create a simpler statute.
1. Loans by Corporations to Shareholders
A good deal of the case law before the enactment of § 7872
involving corporations, shareholders and below-market loans involved
egregious use of close corporations as piggy banks, avoiding dividend
treatment or essentially bailing out corporate earnings, at least
temporarily. 381 That was a conspicuous reason for adopting § 7872 and
it appears taxpayers got the message - there are not many reported cases
involving such behavior.382
An example of the attention to form required in corporationshareholder transactions created by § 7872 may be seen in Mason v.
Commissioner.383 In that case, the married taxpayers were the sole
shareholders of a corporation, Rebuilding Service, Inc. (RSI). They had
a "revolving credit relationship" with RSI under which they borrowed

380. The lender is the creditor with respect to that transaction also for purposes of § 1272(a).
381. See supra notes 86-104 for discussion.
382. A case that might have involved § 7872, but did not, was Yarborough Oldsmobile
Cadillac,Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1282 (1995). Taxpayer received hundreds of
thousands of advances from his closely held corporation over four taxable years, three of which
were after the effective date of § 7872. Id. Many of these advances were for personal expenses of
the taxpayer. Id. Taxpayer was charged with criminal tax offenses for the years at issue and
pleaded guilty. Id. Taxpayer was held to have income as a result of constructive dividends of the
loan proceeds themselves on the basis that the court found taxpayer never intended to repay the
advances. Id. at 33-34. As a means of buttressing his contention that the advances were loans,
taxpayer contended that he began to pay interest on them when § 7872 became effective. Id. at 38.
383. 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1997).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol21/iss1/2

54

Lynch: Taxation of Below-Market Loans Under 7872: This Could be a Lot Si
2006]

TAXATION OF BELOW-MARKET LOANS UNDER

§ 7872

and repaid advances by RSI. 384 In the tax years at issue, taxpayers
borrowed more than $1.5 million from RSI. In the same years they
repaid over $1.2 million. Their ending balances at the ends of the two
tax years were over $2 million.385
Unfortunately for the taxpayers, there was insufficient attention to
detail for purposes of § 7872. The taxpayers did not deduct interest
payments for the years at issue and RSI did not report interest income.
RSI's and taxpayers' ledgers did not characterize taxpayers' repayments
on either principal or interest, although they indicated a dollar for dollar
reduction of taxpayers' indebtedness to RSI. 386 There were neither notes
nor security arrangements accompanying the advances. An accounting
firm hired by taxpayers after the tax years were completed retroactively
reduced taxpayers' repayments to RSI treating the rest as payment of
interest at the applicable federal rate. The IRS disregarded this
retroactive allocation, treating the advances as no-interest loans since no
interest payments were made during the taxable years. Forgone interest
at the applicable federal rate was treated as a dividend to the taxpayers
for the two taxable years.
The taxpayers argued, with some plausibility, that the proposed
regulations treated part of the repayments on loans with fluctuating
balances as payments of accrued interest.387 The court blew hot and cold
388
with the proposed regulation, first noting that it was only "proposed"
and then explaining its inapplicability to taxpayers' circumstances. The
court noted that a parenthetical, "if any," in the regulation referring to
accrued interest indicated that the regulation did not amount to an
imputation provision with
respect to revolving arrangements such as
389
taxpayers had with RSI.
Of course, only by imputation can the IRS contend that there is a
dividend to taxpayers (and interest income to RSI) with respect to such
an arrangement. The imputation under § 7872 is clearly a one-edged
sword, cutting only against the taxpayer. If, with respect to a demand
loan the agreement between lender and borrower provides for interest,
part of any repayments may be regarded as interest. If that amount of
interest amounts to the applicable federal rate, the loan is not below-

384. Id. at 261.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.(citing Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-13(c), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33568 (Aug. 20, 1985)).
388. Id. at 263 (citing KTA-Tator v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 100 (1997) and Frazee v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992)).
389. Mason, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) at 263.
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market. But the proposed regulation that the taxpayers in Mason
attempted to employ, should it ever become final, applies only to stated
interest. 390 The tried and true axiom that taxpayers are bound by the
form of a transaction that they choose applies with respect to § 7872.39
The unintended consequences brought by § 7872 can become even
more complicated with respect to multiple advances by a corporate
lender. Each advance may be treated as a below-market loan if it does
not provide for interest at the applicable federal rate. This problem was
implicit in the facts of Mason, but was addressed explicitly in KTA392
Tator, Inc. v. Commissioner.
In that case, two married shareholders held the taxpayer, KTATator, Inc. It made loans to the shareholders to finance two construction
projects that shareholders would lease to the taxpayer. The taxpayer
contended that it was authorized to fund both projects with a single loan
and that advances were analogous to "draw downs" on a single line of
credit.393 It relied on the proposed regulations as treating an integrated
series of transactions as a loan.394 While again falling back on Frazee in
absolving the Commissioner of accountability for proposed
regulations, 395 the court viewed taxpayer's reliance as misplaced. It
described the regulation as an "antiabuse provision intended to address a
series of transactions where each individual transaction [might] not be a
loan, but collectively the series of transactions has the same effect as a
loan., 396 The court stated that the applicable proposed regulation
provided that when loan proceeds are transferred over time, each transfer
397
of money is a separate loan.
In circumstances in which the applicable federal rate is falling as
transfers are made to the borrower, this is not bad news to either party.
If there are no stated repayment terms, as was the case in KTA-Tator
until the projects were completed, the same problem may arise as
occurred in Mason - repayments are not counted toward the applicable
federal rate unless they are in payment of stated interest. More "loans"
between the parties mean more formalities to observe if the borrower is
actually repaying the advances and desires that some of the repayments
390. Id.
391. Id. at 264 (citing Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S.
134, 149 (1974)).
392. 108 T.C. 100 (1997).
393. Id.at 102.
394. See Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(1), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33557 (Aug. 20, 1985).
395. KTA-Tator, Inc. at 102-03 (citing Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992)).
396. Id.at 103.
397. Id. See Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-2(a)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33557 (Aug. 20, 1985).
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be treated as payments of interest.
With respect to indirect loans between corporations and
shareholders, § 7872 received a broad construction in Rountree Cotton
Co., Inc. v. Commissioner.398 In that case, taxpayer, a close corporation
owned entirely by persons related by blood or marriage, made loans to
its shareholders, none of whom owned a majority of the stock in
taxpayer, and to partnerships and close corporations. These other
entities were owned by the shareholders who owned the taxpayer's
stock, but none of the owners of the entities had a majority interest in
them. The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer had interest on all
of these loans at the applicable federal rate.
With respect to the loans directly to the shareholders, the taxpayer
contended that they were not within § 7872 because the recipients were
not controlling shareholders of the taxpayer. 399 The taxpayer contended
that use of the term "shareholder" in the statute indicated that attribution
rules are not intended to be applied. 400 The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument on the basis that the statute itself does not require that a loan
be made to a controlling shareholder in order for § 7872 to be
applicable. 40 '
Taxpayer contended that the loans to the entities did not come
within § 7872.402 The taxpayer argued particularly that none of the
shareholders held controlling interests in these entities, and that one of
those who held interest in the entities was not a shareholder of the
taxpayer.43 Taxpayer contended that its shareholders received only part
of the benefit of taxpayer's lending to the entities.
The court conceded that neither the statute nor the proposed
regulations addressed the possibility that shareholders might receive less
benefit than the amount lent with respect to an indirect loan.
Nevertheless, the court found the proposed regulations "an effective way
to address the issue we consider here. 40 4 Under the regulation involved,
the loan through the entity is treated as two loans, one to the entity from
the corporation and another from the entity to the shareholder. The court
acknowledged that there might be difficulty in determining the amount
of any dividend to the shareholders because of the presence of a non398.

113 T.C. 422 (1999), af'd, 12 Fed. Appx. 641 (10th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).

399. Id.at 430.
400.
401.

Id. See also I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(C).
Rountree v. Comn'r 113 T.C. 422, 430-31 (1999).

402. Id.at 432.
403.

Id.

404. Id. at 435. See also Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-4(g)(1)(i) and (ii), 50 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33561
(Aug. 20, 1985).
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shareholder in the borrowing entity.40 5 It regarded that as unnecessary
because it was addressing only the corporation's income tax
consequences.4 °6
That does not seem to be quite correct, however. In order to
determine the taxpayer lender's income, the court must determine the
amount of the retransfer. The retransfer creates the taxable event for the
corporation/lender. Treating the gross amount as retransferred from the
shareholders, who may not control the direct recipient entity does not
appear to be called for by the statute. It amounts to a strict liability on
the part of the shareholders with respect to the entire amount of the
forgone interest. That is what would be required to make the lender
entirely taxable on all of the forgone interest on retransfer.
Both Rountree and KTA-Tator involve corporate lenders taxable on
the retransfer of the forgone interest from the borrowers. As with all
other loans to which § 7872 applies, other than some gift loans and taxavoidance loans, it is contended herein that there should be no retransfer
to the lender. The potential abuse inherent in the below-market
corporation/shareholder loan is sufficiently remedied by taxing the
transfer to the shareholder as a dividend. Most of the time the borrower
receives no deduction for the retransfer and since the lender receives no
deduction for making a dividend there is no need for offsetting interest
income. With the scheme of the proposed regulations of the dual
transfers on display in Rountree Cotton, the retransfer poses the
spectrum of unspeakable complexity.
2. Loans from Shareholders to Corporations
Section 7872(c)(1)(C), in applying § 7872 to below-market loans
"between a corporation and any shareholder of such corporation,"
literally applies to loans by shareholders to corporations as well as loans
by corporations to their shareholders. This may be symmetrical, but it is
surprising in light of the state of the law before § 7872. Cases involving
loans by corporations to their shareholders were quite numerous. There
do not seem to have been any involving loans the other way. That is not
surprising, as there does not appear any conceivable form of abuse
involving a shareholder not charging "enough" interest on a loan to
one's own corporation - no possibility of avoidance of double taxation
on corporate earnings, compensation masquerading as loans or the
trafficking of income within a family. There is, perhaps, an implicit
405. Rountree, 113 T.C. at436.
406. Id.
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contribution to capital when a shareholder makes what he or she calls a
loan to a corporation and then does not charge interest. A taxpayer, for
basis purposes, would be better off calling it the purchase of stock, but
that is really no business of the government's. In two reported cases,
407
McGinnis v. Commissioner4°7 and Estate
of Hoffman v. Commissioner,408
taxpayers have had to pay tax with respect to forgone interest on loans to
their corporations.
The characterization of funds committed by a shareholder to his or
her corporation is already a prickly matter. Whether the sums advanced
to a corporation represent stock or debt can determine whether taxpayer
gets a bad debt deduction or a capital loss if the business goes bust.
There is a body of law related to that issue.4 °9 It may control whether
payments by a corporation to a shareholder represent deductible interest
payments or non-deductible dividends. There is likewise a body of law
pertaining to that area.410 In short, what the world of taxation does not
need is another welter of factors for an investor in a corporation to
consider, or fear, in deciding what form the investment will take.
E. Tax-Avoidance Loans
Section 7872(c)(1)(D) provides that § 7872 applies to "any belowmarket loan one of the principal purposes of the interest arrangements of
which is the avoidance of any federal tax. ' AlI This potentially broad
basis for reconfiguring transactions to impute interest at the applicable
federal rate has received virtually no authoritative elaboration other than
in proposed regulations and private letter rulings.412
The notion of tax avoidance for these purposes is stated in rather
stilted fashion in the proposed regulations:
For purposes of this rule, tax avoidance is a principal purpose of the
interest arrangements if a principal factor in the decision to structure
the transaction as a below-market loan (rather than, for example, as a
market interest rate loan and a payment by the lender to the borrower)
407. 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1870 (1993).
408. 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 898 (1999), afid, 8 Fed. Appx. 262 (4th Cir. 2001).
409. See, e.g., Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625 (6th. Cir. 1986).
410. See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694 (3rd Cir. 1968). Congress
intended that the Commissioner promulgate regulations pertaining to that issue under § 385, but
over thirty-five years later the Commissioner has not done so.
411. I.R.C. § 7872 (c)(1)(D) (2000).
412. As noted supra, the Tax Court has resisted giving authoritative, or in some instances any,
weight to the proposed regulations, see, e.g., Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 554 (1992). The
Commissioner has always insisted that private rulings may be relied upon as precedent. See Treas.
Reg. § 601.201(2)(1) (1973). See also Bookwalter v. Brecklein, 357 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1966).
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is to 4reduce
the Federal tax liability of the borrower or the lender or
13
both.

It is difficult to imagine taxpayers plotting tax avoidance as an
alternative to market-rate loans accompanied by a transfer of some
portion of the interest back to the borrower. The transactions provided
in the proposed regulations as examples certainly indicate instances of
taxpayers going the long way around.
The proposed regulations contain a presumption with respect to
below-market loans pursuant to sales or exchanges of property between
related parties.4 14 If, pursuant to a plan incident to a sale or exchange of

property, a party related to the seller makes a below-market loan to the
buyer or makes a below-market loan to the seller that is assumed by the
buyer in connection with the sale or exchange, the loan shall be treated
as a tax-avoidance loan.4 15
An example provided in the proposed regulation demonstrates the
function of this form of reconfiguring the consequences of below-market
loans. In the example, S and T are wholly-owned subsidiaries of a
common parent, p. 416 S sells property to A, an individual, for $3 million
cash. Three months after the sale, T loans A $2 million for ten years at
six percent interest when the applicable federal rate is twelve percent.
The issue price of the loan is discounted to $1,311,805. Total forgone
interest is $688,195. A is treated as having a discount of that amount,
4 17
reducing his or her basis, T is treated as having made a dividend to p
and P is treated as making a contribution to S's capital, both in the same
amount. It is the tax avoidance provision that permits the IRS to impose
consequences on A, who is not presented as a donee, employee or
shareholder of the entities.
The potentially pervasive nature of the provision of § 7872
pertaining to tax-avoidance loans may be seen in a private letter ruling
related to interest-free disaster loans by a state government to disasterstricken businesses. 418 The taxpayers involved were small and mid-sized
businesses that received loans funded by the State of North Carolina.
413. Prop. Reg. § 1.7872-4(e)(1), 51 Fed. Reg. 33553, 33561 (Aug. 20, 1985).
414. Id. at § 1.7872-4(e)(2) (The meaning of related taxpayers is taken from former §
168(e)(4)(D), Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 203, repealed by Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, i.e., persons
bearing the relationships in §§ 267(b), 707(b)(1) or persons engaging in trades or business under
common control within the meaning of § 52).
415. Id. (stating that there is an irrefutable presumption that such a plan exists if the loan is
made within one year of the sale or exchange).
416. See id. at § 1.7872-4(e)(3), Example 1.
417. Presumably P might deduct this under § 243.
418. I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 2000-34-025 (Jun. 8, 2000).
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The parties to the loan did not bear to each other any of the specific
relationships included in § 7872(c)(1), such as employer/employee,
corporation/shareholder, etc. Nonetheless, the service referred to §
7872(c)(1)(D) as applying § 7872 to a below-market loan "the principal
purposes of' 4the
interest arrangements of which is the avoidance of any
19
federal tax.

,

Having staked out the potential applicability of this provision to
circumstances that bore no relationship to abusive situations in the case
law that preceded enactment of § 7872, the IRS backed off applying §
7872 to the disaster victims and the state agencies helping them. It
provided that the legislative history of § 7872 indicated that most
government-subsidized loans were intended to be exempt from §
7872.420
The speculative application of § 7872 to the transaction, but for the
Congressional intent with respect to government loans, indicates the
broad wild card potential of the tax-avoidance provision. With a loan
such as a disaster loan, no tax would be "avoided" except that on the
imputed income on the loan. There is no avoidance of tax on gifts,
compensation or dividend income, the clear targets of other provisions
of § 7872. It thus appears that § 7872 might apply to nearly any belowmarket loan that might avoid taxes if they are not paid on imputed
interest.
F. Loans that Have a SignificantEffect on Lender or Borrower
The final category of loans to which § 7872 applies is loans the
interest arrangements of which have a significant effect on any tax
liability of lender or borrower. 421 This provision is applicable to such
below-market loans "[t]o the extent provided in regulations. ' 422 So far
the Service has provided only temporary regulations that provide the
factors to be considered as to whether a loan's interest arrangements
have a significant tax effect on lender or borrower, but no examples.4 23
419.

Id.

420. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 98-169, at 482 (1984)).
421. I.R.C. § 7872(c)(1)(E).
422. Id.

423. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(c)(3) (1985) which lists as factors in this inquiry:
(i) whether items of income and deduction generated by the loan offset each other;
(ii) the amount of such items;
(iii) the cost to the taxpayer of complying with the provisions of section 7872 if such
section were applied; and
(iv) any non-tax reasons for deciding to structure the transaction as a below-market loan
rather than a loan with interest at a rate equal to or greater than the applicable Federal
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Interestingly, this provision of the temporary regulations is captioned
"Loans without significant tax effect. '424 This enables them to serve the
statutory purpose of this provision, i.e., bringing loans not otherwise
covered by specific relationships enumerated in § 7872(c) and that are
not tax-avoidance loans within the ambit of § 7872, and a second
purpose - exempting loans otherwise covered by § 7872 from that
section on the basis that the interest arrangements do not have significant
tax effects on lender or borrower. The latter purpose, while not
embodied in the statute, is provided for in temporary regulations.42 5
The inclusive, catch-all function of the statute itself was
demonstrated by an example in the legislative history.4 26 The report
describes a member of a club who makes, in lieu of payment of all or
part of his or her membership fee, a non-interest bearing refundable
deposit to the club. The club is to take payment of the member's dues
from investment income from the deposit. As noted in the report, this
has the effect of converting the membership fee into the equivalent of a
deductible expense. The conferees regarded conversion of a nondeductible expense into the equivalent of a deduction as an effect on the
borrower or lender.4 27
This example was the subject of a private ruling.428 The ruling
describes a transaction similar to that described in the Conference
Report. The main difference is that club members are expected to pay
their annual dues independently of the loan. 429 Nevertheless, the Service
noted its awareness of attempts to use such loans to convert
nondeductible expenses into the equivalent of deductible expenses.43 °
The ruling stated that since the Service has not proposed regulations
defining significant effect loans, this arrangement cannot be classified as
within § 7872(c)(1)(E).4 3 1
It is somewhat ironic that, over twenty years after its enactment, the
explicit statutory purpose of this provision - drawing loans into § 7872 cannot be fulfilled because the Service has not adopted regulations while

rate and a payment by the lender to the borrower.

Id.
424.
425.
426.
273-74.
427.

428.
429.
430.
431.

Id.
See id. at § 1.7872-5T(b)(14).
H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1019-20 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984-3 C.B., vol. 2,
Id.

I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 97-35-002 (May 5, 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol21/iss1/2

62

Lynch: Taxation of Below-Market Loans Under 7872: This Could be a Lot Si
2006]

TAXATION OF BELOW-MARKET LOANS UNDER § 7872

the Service has, by temporary regulation, created an opposite purpose for
the statute, excluding loans otherwise within § 7872. One case and a
handful of private regulations address this latter purpose.
In McGinnis, taxpayers who had made below-market loans to their
wholly-owned subsidiaries contended that relatively small amounts of
the adjustments made as a result of such loans, $5,694.32 for 1985 and
$5,313.77 for 1986, indicated that the transactions should be exempted
from § 7872.432 The court perceived the taxpayers to have otherwise
conceded application of § 7872. 4 33 The taxpayers were relying on the
temporary regulations which exempt loans otherwise covered by § 7872
as to which the taxpayer is able to show that the interest arrangements
have no significant tax effect on either the lender or the borrower.434
They asserted that the loans did not have significant tax effects and that
they had non-tax reasons for structuring the loans as they did. In the
absence of introduction of the loan documents into evidence by the
taxpayers the court was unconvinced that the amounts of the
Commissioner's adjustments alone indicated that the loans were without
significant effect. Unlike other portions of the proposed regulations in
other circumstances,43 5 the Tax Court appeared to treat the factors in the
proposed regulations for evaluating the significance of the tax effects as
authoritative.
The three private rulings that address this issue, two dealing with
similar taxpayer problems, demonstrate how the temporary regulations
can rescue a transaction from § 7872. They also raise questions as to the
necessity of the substantial tax-effects portion of § 7872 as a tax
enforcement tool.
Two private rulings address taxpayers who provide payroll data
processing services for clients. In a 1987 ruling, the taxpayer, in order to
make a client's payroll payments, deposited the client's pre-authorized
draft into its own collection account.4 36 Then the client funds were
deposited in a central account where they were pooled with the funds of
other clients. From that account they were transferred to a disbursement
account. Because of the client's staggered payroll dates, the taxpayer
accumulated substantial amounts in the central account, which it
transferred to a long-term investment account. Taxpayer contended that
it was administratively impossible to determine how long an individual
432.
433.
434.
435.

McGinnis, 65 T.C.M. 1870.
Id. at 1875.
Id. See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(b)(14) (1985).
See, e.g., Frazee, 98 T.C. 554.

436.

I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 87-29-011 (Apr. 15, 1987).
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client's funds are held or whether they are allocated to the investment
account. A 1998 ruling concerning a taxpayer in essentially the same
business employed an identical process of handling client funds and
investment of temporary excess of client funds over disbursements.43 7
Interpreting the term "loan" broadly, the Service characterized the
advances of funds to both taxpayers as loans between independent
contractors and persons for whom they perform services to which §
7872(c)(1)(B) would apply. In both instances, however, the Service
looked to the temporary regulations to determine whether the loans had a
substantial effect on any federal tax liability of the lender or borrower.438
In both instances, the Service noted that if interest were imputed on
the client "loans" there would be offsetting interest deductions. Since
these taxpayers are businesses, they would be unaffected by the personal
interest deduction limits enacted in 1986. 43 ' Although in both cases the
Service indicated that the taxpayers earned significant amounts of
income annually, it noted that the individual advancements were small
and short-term. In both instances, the Service noted that it would be
expensive for the taxpayers to comply with § 7872. It would be very
difficult to account for each loan from each client.
In the 1987 ruling, the Service concluded that the client "loans" did
not have significant tax effects. In the 1998 ruling, the Service stated
that, "tax avoidance is a principal purpose of a loan if it is the principal
factor in a decision to structure the transaction as a below-market loan
rather then as a loan at the applicable federal rate., 440 Since the
taxpayer's method of collection and disbursement of client funds was in
response to administrative and technological limitations, tax avoidance
was not a principal purpose of the interest arrangements of the taxpayer.
Thus, the Service concluded that the transactions did not have significant
effects on lender or borrower within the meaning of the temporary
regulations.44 '
Neither ruling addressed the obvious point that since the excess, or
"loaned," client funds were transferred to a particular account the
interest income of which was easily identifiable, the taxpayers could
easily be held to account for any economic benefit from the transaction
without requiring the taxpayers to go through the expense of obtaining a
letter ruling. Had the transactions been held within the ambit of § 7872,
437.
438.

I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 98-52-047 (Sept. 30, 1998).
Id. See also Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.7872-5T(b)(14), -5T(c)(3) (1985).

439. See I.R.C. § 163(h).
440.
441.

I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 98-52-047.
Id. See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-5T(b)(14) (1985).
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the clients would have discovered that they were "lenders" owing to the
business exigencies of their payroll accounting services. If a client
objects to the "free" use of its money by its payroll accountant, it may
look for an accountant that does not do so, or does so to a lesser degree.
Free use of a client's funds is to some extent a price of the service, and a
benefit to the provider that is easily measured without resort to § 7872.
A 1989 letter ruling addressed deposit by attorneys of client funds
into Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) under a program
created by a state supreme court.4 42 Under this program, client funds
other than those for costs and expenses are deposited into IOLTA trust
accounts, the interest of which is used for various charitable purposes
unless the client insists that funds be deposited in a non-interest-bearing
account. In the event that more than a certain amount is earned on client
funds, such excess may be transmitted to the client.
In the ruling, the Service considered whether § 7872 should be
applied to the "loan" by clients to IOLTA trusts. The Service said §
7872 did not apply, for no reason that had anything to do with § 7872
itself. It stated that the income from the trust was taxable to the client
under the assignment of income doctrine. 443 Although sending the client
a Form 1099 for interest income under such circumstances seems harsh
unless the client may take a charitable deduction for the amount, the
rationale of the ruling cuts to the chase with respect to the application of
§ 7872 in business transactions adequately accounted for by other
income tax provisions. It is not necessary. Other than the example
above in the 1997 letter ruling pertaining to the club membership loans,
§ 7872, outside the areas that were widespread abuses in Dean's heyday,
appears to be a superfluity.
V. SOME SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE § 7872 SIMPLER AND FAIRER

Section 7872 has now had a history that is approximately the same
length as that of the regime of Dean v. Commissioner. As that history
demonstrated the need for some reform with respect to below-market
loans, so too the history of § 7872 has demonstrated areas where the law
may be made less cumbersome or more fair.
First, the retransfer of forgone interest from borrower to lender may
entail some statutory symmetry, but, for the most part, it is unnecessary.
There is no reason, with compensation or corporation loans respectively,
to make an employer or corporation report an item of income to cancel
442. I.R.S. Pvt. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-022 (Dec. 22, 1989).
443. Id. (citing Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941)).
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out its deduction for compensation or charge to earnings and profits.
With the elimination of the deduction for personal interest for the
borrower in 1986, the retransfer is nearly vestigial. The retransfer
should be retained for gift loans, when such loans between lender and
borrower exceed $10,000, to the extent that the borrower has net
investment income. In such instances, there is a clear possibility of
shifting income to a lower bracket taxpayer and the retransfer is a useful
means to combat such avoidance.
If the borrower with respect to a gift loan does not have net
investment interest there should be no retransfer regardless of the
amount of the loan. Such a transaction may be subject to gift tax.
Subjecting a retransfer to income tax for the lender imposes a tax on the
"opportunity cost" of the lender so properly rejected by two Dean-era
courts. 444 The retransfer should also be retained for tax-avoidance loans
under § 7872(c)(1)(D).
The income reporting with respect to term loans creates a grotesque
distortion of income with respect to a borrower. Section 7872(b)(1)
treats the entire amount of the original issue discount as transferred to
the borrower on the day the loan is made. If the term of the loan is long,
this may result in a substantial up-front payment of taxes, and yet, in
such a circumstance, the distortion of income is greatest since the
borrower realistically enjoys the benefit of the loan over its term.
Compensation and corporation/shareholder loans should be
redefined to limit the applicability of § 7872 to loans by employers to
employees or by corporations to shareholders. There was clearly a
history of abuse during the Dean era with respect to below-market
compensation and corporate loans, particularly the latter. There was no
such demonstrated history with respect to loans the other way.
Analyzing advances of capital to corporations under § 7872 adds another
wrinkle to a debt-equity area that is already plenty complicated.
Finally, Congress should seriously consider eliminating the
classification of below-market loans in § 7872(b)(1)(E), i.e., for loans
where the interest arrangements of which have a significant effect on
any federal tax liability of the lender or borrower. Congress has not
even promulgated the final regulations upon which implementation of
this part of the statute depends. The limited history of private rulings in
connection with this section indicates that possibilities for tax avoidance
may be addressed by other sections of the Code or doctrines of tax law.
444. See Crown v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1060 (1977); Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp.
73 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
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VI. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to point to an income tax provision enacted in recent
years that is as complicated or intrusive as § 7872. The issues that led to
its creation still lurk, especially if interest rates rise from the near
historical low rates of recent years. But in several significant ways, §
7872 far overshot its mark. Sound tax policy would counsel that it be
amended to a more appropriately targeted tool to limit tax avoidance.
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